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ABSTRACT
STITCHED TOGETHER: THE SINGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND ITS
EMPLOYEES IN REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA, 1914-1930
by
Jenna Himsl
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Christine Evans
In 1914, the Russian Empire was the largest foreign market of the Singer Manufacturing
Company. Following the Russian Revolution, Singer’s Russian subsidiary, Kompaniya Singer,
was nationalized in a piecemeal fashion. Singer’s employees were forced to adapt to the new
order or attempt to leave Soviet Russia. This thesis addresses the ways in which Kompaniya
Singer and its employees built, used, fostered, and hampered national and institutional identities
during the chaotic period from 1914 to 1930 in their quests to respond to the shifting political
foundations of Russian society. As it became impossible for Kompaniya Singer and its
cosmopolitan, managerial employees to adapt to the nationalist and Bolshevik changes of the
early twentieth century, they relied on each other for stability and aid. This thesis explores the
causes, expressions, and extent of this mutual reliance. This mutual reliance amid adversity adds
a new dimension to corporation-employee relationships—especially the concept of corporate
company men—and complicates discussions of identity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1904, the House of Singer (Dom Kompanii Zinger) opened across from the Kazan
Cathedral on St. Petersburg’s Nevsky Prospect.1 The building was the new home of Kompaniya
Singer, the Russian subsidiary of the famous American sewing machine firm.

Atop the

impressive building and towering over St. Petersburg’s other commercial structures, two statues
held aloft a globe of the world encircled by a band reading “Singer.” Visible to all in the
imperial capital, the Singer Manufacturing Company’s name emblazoned around the world
proclaimed the company’s multinational perspective and global ambitions. Singer, one of the
first American multinational enterprises, planned to surround the planet with its sewing machine
empire. The impressive Nevsky Prospect building spoke to the importance of Kompaniya Singer
and the Russian market within the Singer Manufacturing Company’s global enterprise.
The upheaval of the early twentieth century, however, changed both Kompaniya Singer
and the House of Singer. During the First World War, Singer’s retail shops in the war zone were
unable to function. On the home front, Kompaniya Singer’s international connections drew
suspicion from governmental and business officials. When revolutions rocked the Russian
government in 1917, Kompaniya Singer and its employees faced the specter of nationalization
and the uncertainties of the future. By the 1920s, the globe above Nevsky Prospect no longer
marked the House of Singer. The building, commandeered by the Soviet officials, had become
(and remains still) a bookstore.2
As the story of its former headquarters suggests, Kompaniya Singer found itself
increasingly at odds with a society that was growing more nationalistic and less friendly to
Olga Matich, “28 Nevsky Prospect: The Sewing Machine, the Seamstress, and Narrative,” in
“Petersburg”/Petersburg: Novel and City, 1900-1921 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 239.
2
Ibid., 257.
1

1

global enterprises. Singer’s multinational identity increasingly became a source of strife for
Kompaniya Singer and its employees. Singer’s goals, like its Nevsky Prospect building were
unabashedly multinational. The company sought to expand its retail empire and to sell as many
sewing machines as possible. To this end, the American parent company and its Russian
subsidiary recruited and accepted employees from many diverse backgrounds. In the Russian
Empire, Kompaniya Singer employed local workers, foreign executives, and many members of
ethnic minority groups. 3 The company’s employees were as multinational as Singer, and both
company and employees had to navigate the waters of increasing nationalism and rising
bolshevism. In doing so, the company and many of its employees used Singer’s connections and
networks for help.
Association with Singer’s supranational network opened doors and lines of
communication for employees in need. During the Russian Civil War, these needs could be
great, and Singer’s assistance became an important asset for many of Kompaniya Singer’s
executive and managerial employees. Identification with Singer’s supranational network
provided benefits that were not always readily available via other associations. At times, this
institutional identification with Singer competed with other more traditionally discussed
identities, such as nationality, class, and religion. In some instances, identification with and
connection to Singer was more valuable and expedient to Kompaniya Singer employees than was
any other identity.

In the chapters that follow, this thesis addresses the ways in which

Kompaniya Singer and its employees built, used, fostered, and hampered these national and
institutional identities during the chaotic period from 1914 to 1930. As it became impossible for
Kompaniya Singer and its cosmopolitan employees to adapt to the nationalist and Marxist

3

Fred V. Carstensen, American Enterprise in Foreign Markets: Studies of Singer and International Harvester in
Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 71-72, 80-82.

2

changes of the early twentieth century, they relied on each other for stability and aid. This mutual
reliance amid adversity adds a new dimension to corporation-employee relationships.
Sources and a Small Group of Singer Employees
While it may be relatively simple to discuss the actions and policies of a corporation, like
Kompaniya Singer, it is far more complicated to unravel the actions and motivations of its
employees. In 1914, Kompaniya Singer employed over 30,000 men and women throughout the
Russian Empire.4 These employees came from across social classes and ethnic groups. To trace
the actions and movements of all employees throughout the upheaval of the early twentieth
century would be an impossible task.
Within the archival record, however, a small group of Kompaniya Singer’s employees
stands out in vivid relief. Between 1921 and 1930, thirty-seven men and one woman gave Singer
formal affidavits of their experiences in Russia, resulting in a total of forty-six affidavits.5 These
affidavit writers had left Russia following the revolutions, and all but two of them were
Kompaniya Singer employees. In their testimonies, they relate the demise of their former
employer, as well as their personal experiences in imperial and Soviet Russia. Singer collected
these affidavits in several European capitals as evidence of their corporate losses in Russia.
Seeking restitution, Singer submitted the affidavits to the United States Department of State in
the 1930s and again to the Federal Claims Settlement Commission in the 1950s. These records
Formation of the Staff, European Trip – Russia – 1915, box 155, folder 9, Singer Manufacturing Company
Records, U.S. Mss AI, Wisconsin Historical Society, Library-Archives Division (hereafter cited as Singer Mss).
5
Most of affidavits were given in 1921 or 1930. Eight affidavit subjects submitted two affidavits, one each in 1921
and 1930. An additional affidavit writer, Walter Dixon, gave affidavits in 1920 and 1921. See Affidavit of W.F.
Dixon, July 24, 1920, 461.11 Si 6, Records of the Department of State Relating to U.S. Claims Against Russia,
1910-1929 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T640, roll 8), General Records of the Department of State,
Record Group 59 (RG 59), National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP) and Affidavit of Walter F. Dixon,
February 25, 1921, 461.11 Si 6, Records of the Department of State Relating to U.S. Claims Against Russia, 19101929 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T640, roll 8), RG 59, NACP. Voldemar Ernst’s affidavit was
recorded in 1923, see Affidavit of Voldemar Wilhelm Ernst, July 5, 1923, Records of the Department of State
Relating to U.S. Claims Against Russia, 1910-1929 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T640, roll 8), RG 59,
NACP.
4
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remain in Singer’s corporate archives at the Wisconsin Historical Society and in the State
Department files at the U.S. National Archives.
These affidavits, combined with the correspondence and supplemental records held by
both the Wisconsin Historical Society and the National Archives, drive the questions asked by
this thesis. Who were the employees that gave affidavits to Singer? How did this cosmopolitan
and managerial population experience Russia’s First World War and Revolution? Finally, how
did these employees interact with and understand their relationship to their multinational
employer?
The small number of employees represented in these affidavits is not a representative
sample of Singer’s workforce. There is not a single affidavit given by one of Singer’s unskilled
Podolsk factory workers.

Executives, managers, and ethnically German employees are

overrepresented in both the affidavits and the letters. The Singer Manufacturing Company
archival records even include a few letters written in German. Some of the reasons for this
overrepresentation will be addressed in the chapters that follow, but it is important to note here
that the findings of this thesis are not intended to speak to the entirety of Singer’s labor force.
Any patterns discussed must be limited to this small population, whom Singer executives could
still contact for affidavits years after Singer produced its last sewing machine in Russia. The
story of each individual employee, even within this group, is riddled with different concerns and
opportunities. Where patterns exist within the letters and affidavits, however, I argue that these
are significant indicators of a corporate culture or subculture. The absence of factory employees
from the affidavits, for instance, may not be simply an oversight by the Singer leadership, but a
hint to the cultural and class differences between Kompaniya Singer’s leadership and its Podolsk
workers.

While it may be impossible to assess the breadth of Kompaniya Singer’s post-

4

revolution network, the testimonies of the company’s employees speak to the varying depths and
utility of identifying or aligning with Singer and its resources.
Telling Singer’s Story
Many historians have discussed the impact of the Singer Manufacturing Company on
international business, but the experiences of the company’s employees have received less
attention.6

Historians investigating the Singer Manufacturing Company have historically

approached the subject from a corporate or economic vantage point. Because Russia held an
important place among Singer’s foreign markets, it draws substantial attention in such accounts. 7
Kompaniya Singer’s growth and success are fittingly held up as examples of the Singer
Manufacturing Company’s multinational scope and ambitions. The premier history of Singer’s
international expansion, Robert Bruce Davies’ Peacefully Working to Conquer the World: Singer
Sewing Machines in Foreign Markets, 1854-1920, details Kompaniya Singer’s expansion and
demise from this business perspective. While Davies discusses Kompaniya Singer’s challenges,
he considers the struggles of Singer’s employees only as pieces in the company’s successes and
failures.8

Like Davies, historian Fred V. Carstensen discussed Kompaniya Singer within the

context of business expansion. In his comprehensive comparative analysis of Singer’s and
International Harvester’s Russian operations before the First World War, Carstensen sheds light
on the ethnic makeup and structure of Singer’s managerial staff. Carstensen’s goal is to explain

An exception within the Russian context is Kompaniya Singer’s factory manager, Walter Dixon, who features
prominently in two articles by Mona Domosh. See Mona Domosh, "American Capitalist Experiments in
Revolutionary-Era Russia," Journal of Historical Geography 39 (2013): 43-53,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2012.04.004 and Mona Domosh, "Labor Geographies in a Time of Early
Globalization: Strikes against Singer in Scotland and Russia in the Early 20th Century," Geoforum 39 (2008): 16761686, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.04.004.
7
For a general corporate history of the Singer Manufacturing Company that references Kompaniya Singer, see Don
Bissell, The First Conglomerate: 145 Years of the Singer Sewing Machine Company (Brunswick, ME: Audenreed
Press, 1999).
8
Robert Bruce Davies, Peacefully Working to Conquer the World: Singer Sewing Machines in Foreign Markets,
1854-1920 (New York: Arno Press, 1976), 243-333.
6

5

Singer’s administrative efficiency, however, and he addresses Singer’s employees primarily as
agents of Singer, rather than as self-motivated actors.9
Although histories like Davies’ and Carstensen’s do not highlight many of the affidavit
writers that are fundamental to this thesis, these books introduce in detail the historical
foundations of Kompaniya Singer in the late nineteenth century. They discuss Singer’s early
forays into the Russian Empire, Kompaniya Singer’s 1897 incorporation as a Russian company,
and its early 19th century expansion across the empire. This expansion was made manifest in a
factory in the town of Podolsk (near Moscow), sales offices across the empire, and, of course, the
imposing Nevsky Prospect headquarters. The Podolsk factory, which Kompaniya Singer began
constructing in 1900 and opened in 1902, employed over 5,000 workers by 1914. 10 It was the
only sewing machine factory in the Russian Empire.11

Kompaniya Singer’s sales network

likewise thrived. The company covered the empire with fifty central agencies, each responsible
for several smaller depots, by the outbreak of World War I. 12 Sales ballooned from 68,788 in
1895 to over 650,000 in 1914.13 Carstensen estimates that Singer controlled up to 90 percent of
the Russian sewing machine market.14 Russia was the Singer Manufacturing Company’s largest
foreign market by 1914.15
Despite its success, Kompaniya Singer remained a foreign presence within the Empire,
and this foreign and multinational character is essential to understanding its employees’
experiences. The company had roots in America and deferred to the Singer Manufacturing
9

Fred V. Carstensen, American Enterprise in Foreign Markets: Studies of Singer and International Harvester in
Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 97.
10
Protocol of the Commission of the All-Russian Zemstvo and Town Associations, 153-55, box 155, folder 1,
Singer Mss.
11
Formation of the Company and Organization of the Business, European Trip Documents – Russia – 1915, box
155, folder 9, 22, Singer Mss.
12
Carstensen, American Enterprise in Foreign Markets, 62.
13
Carstensen, American Enterprise in Foreign Markets, 56.
14
Ibid., 85.
15
Ibid., 55.
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Company headquarters in New York. This deference made Kompaniya Singer and, indeed, all
of Singer’s foreign offices, fundamentally different from its American market. Kompaniya
Singer was inherently and overtly multinational.

Unlike Singer’s American employees,

Kompaniya Singer workers were part of a foreign enterprise with foreign obligations and
loyalties.
The position of Kompaniya Singer and its employees in a foreign environment has been
the focus of geographer Mona Domosh and it plays an important role in the framing of this
thesis. Domosh rejects the notion that American economic dominance in Russia and elsewhere
was preordained. She stresses the actions of corporate executives and employees as the creators
of Singer and other multinational corporations.16 In several recent articles, Domosh positions
Kompaniya Singer within the context of larger trends of early globalization and expansionary
capitalism. Among these trends, Domosh devotes considerable attention to the concept of
“embeddedness,” by which she means the “relationships between economic actors…and
noneconomic actors” within a particular social network and territorial context.17 Domosh uses
this concept to complicate the narrative of American economic globalization.

While she

discusses the grounding of Singer’s employees, particularly its management, within Russia
society, Domosh does not deal explicitly with questions of institutional identity, that is, how the
employees related to Singer and its multinational orientation. This thesis probes these questions
of the voluntary and symbiotic ties between Singer and its employees, as well as the limitations
of such ties.

16

Mona Domosh, "The World Was Never Flat: Early Global Encounters and the Messiness of Empire," Progress in
Human Geography 34, no. 4 (2010): 419.
17
Mona Domosh, "Uncovering the Friction of Globalization: American Commercial Embeddedness and Landscape
in Revolutionary-Era Russia," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100, no. 2 (2010):429. doi:
10.1080/00045601003638733.
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The ways in which Kompaniya Singer and its employees related to and called upon the
multinational Singer network changed and expanded with the turmoil of the First World War and
Russian Revolution, yet employees’ experiences have garnered only minor attention in histories
of Kompaniya Singer’s demise. Earlier studies, like Davies’ and Carstensen’s books, have
focused on the business and economic consequences of Kompaniya Singer’s nationalization.
Davies touches on Kompaniya Singer’s demise, but the most thorough discussions of the
nationalization of American firms are doctoral dissertations written by Floyd James Fithian and
Thomas J. O’Neill.18 O’Neill and Fithian use the claims submitted by American corporations to
the Federal Claims Settlement Commission to reconstruct the corporate losses that Singer and
other American companies sustained under the Soviet authorities. While O’Neill only touches
on Singer’s case, Fithian details much of Singer’s loss. 19 Much as Davies and Carstensen
elucidated the business practices and situations that led to Singer’s success in Russia, O’Neill
and Fithian explain the political and business realities that led to Kompaniya Singer’s demise.
Within these narratives, however, Singer’s individual employees rarely appear, and the stories of
the employees’ personal navigation of the post-revolution era remain to be told.
The telling of these employee stories is a primary focus of this thesis. In the chapters that
follow, this thesis examines the ways in which Kompaniya Singer and its employees mobilized
identities, including identification with Singer.

By embracing different identities, Singer’s

employees were given access to different communication and assistance networks.

The

mobilization of these identities provides insight into the perceived utility of different networks
during this chaotic era. Although the early twentieth century is often spoken of as a high-water
Davies, Peacefully Working to Conquer the World, 306-333; Floyd James Fithian, “Soviet-American Economic
Relations, 1918-1933: American Business in Russia during the Period of Nonrecognition,” Ph.D. diss., University of
Nebraska, 1964; Thomas J. O’Neill, “Business, Investment and Revolution in Russia: Case Studies of American
Companies, 1880s-1920s,” Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1987.
19
Fithian, “Soviet-American Economic Relations,” 14-20, 36-38.
18

8

point for nationalist sentiments, and the Bolshevik Revolution highlighted the significance of
class consciousness, the affidavit writers found value in identifying with Singer in addition to or
instead of these other identities.

Singer’s multinational nature fostered a form of

cosmopolitanism among its employees.
Broadening the Discussion
In order to consider the choices made and identities embraced by Kompaniya Singer’s
affidavit writing employees, it is necessary to reach beyond the bounds of economic and business
history. Singer’s employees were not just surrogates for their employer; they were actors in their
own right. They made choices and ascribed loyalties based on their own best interests, not
necessarily Singer’s. The experiences and actions of Singer’s affidavit writers can best be
understood within the broader discussions surrounding national identity, the emergence of a
cosmopolitan and transnational capitalist class, and the mobility regimes of the interwar period.
The embrace and assignment of identities, particularly national and institutional
identities, is a significant aspect of understanding Singer’s affidavit writers. Within the wide
literature on nationalism, there has been much discussion of the creation and adoption of
identities.

Benedict Anderson introduced to this discussion the idea of the “imagined

community.” To Anderson, a nation was constructed by its members as “an imagined political
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” 20 As an imagined group,
Anderson’s nation is more flexible than nations are often thought to be. This nation can reach
beyond the immediate realities of politics or communication networks. Despite this flexibility,
Anderson implicitly argues that the embeddedness of individuals in a time, place, and culture
leads to identification with a particular nationality. Tara Zahra, on the other hand, suggests that

20

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed.
(London: Verso, 1991), 6.

9

many actors are between national identities. Drawing her examples primarily from the nationally
diverse borderlands of Central and Eastern Europe, Zahra argues that many people are not
interested in national projects or shift national identity depending on time, place, and other
concerns.21 Zahra labels these nationally fluid or disinterested actors as “nationally indifferent”
and argues that they constitute a large segment of many societies. Zahra contends that, contrary
to previous assumptions, historians should start from the proposition that many, if not most,
people did not see themselves as part of national projects.22 Although these authors differ in the
primacy they give to national identity, all posit identities that are constructed and therefore
malleable.

This fluidity of identity, in national and other forms, is fundamental to the

opportunistic and pragmatic ways in which Singer’s affidavit writers relate to the company, the
government, and the nation.
The identities that Singer’s employees mobilized from 1914 to 1930 were not exclusively
national, but also encompassed a variety of institutional and transnational groups. Corporate
identity and loyalty, particularly the significance and motivations of loyal corporate employees,
which I refer to as “company men,” have been considered by many authors.23 Within these
studies, an institutional identity with an employer is often a source of fiscal security, but also a
means of stifling individualism. Many of these discussions of company men are grounded
within particular times and spaces.24 This study of Kompaniya Singer adds another specific case
study to this expanding literature.

Tara Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Slavic Review 69, no.
1 (2010): 102-103.
22
Ibid., 118.
23
For instance, see William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956); Clark
Davis, Company Men: White-Collar Life and Corporate Cultures in Los Angeles, 1892-1941 (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 2000); Anthony Sampson, Company Man: The Rise and Fall of Corporate Life (London:
HarperCollins, 1995); and Donna M. Randall, “Commitment and the Organization: The Organization Man
Revisited,” Academy of Management Review 12, no. 3 (1987): 460-471.
24
See Whyte, Organization Man; and Davis, Company Men.
21
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Singer’s company men are set apart, however, by the transnational nature of their
employer. This thesis, therefore, also seeks to place Singer’ employees within the discussion of
transnational networks and community building. Drawing upon Benedict Anderson as well as
several other theorists, Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack have introduced what they call
“transnational communities.” These communities, the authors argue, share five essential traits: (i)
community identity is one of many claimed by the individual, i.e. it does not replace local
identities; (ii) active community members are engaged and embedded in both the local and
transnational communities, becoming what the authors call “rooted cosmopolitans;” (iii)
transnational communities are imagined and therefore fluid; (iv) transnational communities allow
for a “fair amount of within-community diversity;” and (v) the communities are often short-lived
or fleeting associations.25 In some ways, Singer’s multinational network facilitated and sustained
such a transnational community for its employees. As a business, Singer had objectives other
than such community building, yet against the backdrop of state and societal upheaval in Russia,
Singer’s multinational character gave it a stability that helped to maintain a useful network for its
affidavit writers. The extent and value of Kompaniya Singer as a community and network is
therefore an important component of this thesis.
In addition to Singer’s multinational practices, Kompaniya Singer’s employees were
motivated by their own cosmopolitan and transnational experiences.

Some authors have

discussed transnational migrations that followed the Russian Revolution as one of the first
examples of a modern cosmopolitanism, but Singer’s employees exhibit an even earlier

Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, “Transnational Communities and Governance,” in Transnational
Communities: Shaping Global Economic Governance, ed. Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25-28.
25

11

cosmopolitanism.26 In discussing this distinctively modern and corporate cosmopolitanism, this
thesis builds upon and incorporates later discussions of twentieth and twenty-first century
transnational business classes and the rise of a global elite.

27

While authors discussing the

twenty-first century trends of globalization purport to address an emerging phenomenon, I argue
that Singer and its employees employed similar national indifference and supranational loyalties
a century earlier.
This argument derives, in part, from a variation on assertions made by Yuri Slezkine in
his book, The Jewish Century. Slezkine argues that the European Jews of the nineteenth and
twentieth century were one example of a culture of mobile service providers that he calls
“Mercurians.” One of the ties that held the Jews together as a national group was the “corporate
kinship” of their work. Not bound to the land, the national bonds of “Mercurians” differ from
those of their farming neighbors. 28 Slezkine’s “Mercurians” are united by their professional
networks, which reinforce and enhance national connections.

Using Slezkine’s idea of

“Mercurian” cultures, Benjamin Sawyer suggests that, in late Imperial Russia, the Germanspeaking elite may have filled these roles. 29 Singer’s multinational character built upon and
fostered “Mercurian” identities and corporate loyalty among its employees, many of whom were
part of the Imperial Russian German-speaking elite.
Discussions of “Mercurians” and cosmopolitans are necessarily tied to understandings of
mobility and migration. Individual mobility and migration within Russia, as well as emigration
See Rebecka Lettevall, “Cosmopolitanism in Practice: Perspectives on the Nansen Passports,” in East European
Disasporas, Migration and Cosmopolitanism, ed. Ulrike Ziemer and Sean P. Roberts (London: Routledge, 2013),
13-24.
27
For discussions of a global elite as a late twentieth and early twenty-first century concept, see Bruce Mazlish and
Elliott R. Morss, “A Global Elite?” in Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History, ed.
Alfred D. Chandler and Bruce Mazlish (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45-79 and Leslie Sklair,
The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
28
Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 24-25.
29
Benjamin Sawyer, "Manufacturing Germans: Singer Manufacturing Company and American Capitalism in the
Russian Imagination during World War I," Enterprise & Society 17, no. 2 (2016): 20, doi: 10.1017/eso.2015.71.
26
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from Russia, in the late tsarist and early Soviet periods have become significant topics of study
in recent years.

This thesis enters into these discussions by highlighting a less discussed

dimension of this mobility.

While discussions of mobility often draw divisions between

displaced persons and voluntary cosmopolitans, the experiences of Singer’s affidavit writers
speak to the convergence and overlap of these two groups.
Organization of the Thesis
In assessing identities of Singer and its employees, this thesis follows a roughly
chronological progression.

The first chapter addresses Kompaniya Singer’s conception of

nationality during the First World War (1914-1917).

Set against the Imperial Russian

government’s investigations of Kompaniya Singer’s German connections, this chapter considers
the efforts of Kompaniya Singer’s leaders to assert a Russian identity for themselves and their
company. In doing so, the chapter addresses the effect of Russian economic nationalism on the
multinational identities of Singer and its employees. This chapter explores the limitations of
Kompaniya Singer’s attempt to embrace Russianness, especially in consideration of its perceived
and real relationships with the Russian, American, and British states. Special attention is paid to
the role of German and Russian ethnic identities within Singer’s self-conception.
The second chapter focuses on relationship between Kompaniya Singer and the affidavit
writers during the Russian Revolution and Civil War. Tracing the piecemeal disintegration of
Singer’s Russian business, this chapter highlights the different ways in which Kompaniya Singer
employees experienced revolutionary Russia and how these experiences influenced their
relationship to Singer. Drawing on discussions of corporate loyalty and corporate identity, this
chapter considers what it meant to be a Kompaniya Singer “company man” during the
revolution. In contrast to mid-twentieth century ideas of corporate identification, I argue that
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Kompaniya Singer’s company men mobilized their relationship with Kompaniya Singer to serve
their own best interests.
The third chapter considers the legacy and networks of Kompaniya Singer in the period
from 1919 to 1930. While the timeline of this chapter overlaps with the previous section, this
chapter focuses on Kompaniya Singer’s employees once they left Russia. Complementing the
previous chapter, this chapter discusses the ways in which Singer mobilized its displaced
employees within and outside Russia to create a “company in exile.” Drawing on discussions of
the Russian emigrant communities of the interwar period (known as Russia Abroad), this chapter
discusses the pragmatic ways in which Singer Manufacturing Company executives attempted to
maintain the networks of their Russian company in the hope of reentering the Russian market.
Once these hopes began to appear futile, Singer executives and employees began to reassess and
adapt their relationship with one another. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter confirms
the symbiotic relationship of complementary goals that existed between Singer and the affidavit
writers.
Throughout these chapters, this thesis probes the extent and variety of national,
institutional, and multinational identities within the largest foreign market of one of the world’s
first multinational corporations. Kompaniya Singer and its employees mobilized a variety of
identities and networks to their own benefit.

The multinational character of the Singer

Manufacturing Company and the cosmopolitanism of its employees facilitated this national and
institutional fluidity, but, as became especially obvious during World War I and the Russian
Revolution, they also limited the options for adaptation. With limited options, Kompaniya
Singer’s affidavit writers looked to their employer as a source of stability and aid. Singer, on its
part, turned to these same employees as trustworthy sources of information and dependability.
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Through the story of the symbiotic relationship between Kompaniya Singer and its
employees, this thesis adds new dimensions to the concept of a corporate company man. Singer,
a vast multinational enterprise, grew to rely on its Russian company men as individuals, not as
interchangeable employees. These cosmopolitan company men, in turn, sought out the aid that
only a transnational organization like Singer could supply. Company and employees became
willing allies and powerful partners.
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Chapter 2
Kompaniya Singer and Russianness during World War I
In the summer of 1915, the Imperial Russian government closed over 500 shops
belonging to Kompaniya Singer, the Russian subsidiary of the Singer Manufacturing Company.
Singer was the largest supplier and only manufacturer of sewing machines within the Russian
Empire.

30

The sewing machine company had been present in the Russian market since the

1860s, but it became a target of suspicion in the rising nationalism of the First World War.
Singer, which had originally come to the Russian Empire through the company’s German office,
was accused of being under the control of enemy aliens and functioning as a front for German
spies. While these accusations were false, it would take Singer executives in New York and
Moscow over a year to free Singer from Russian government oversight and interference.
There is no simple explanation as to why it took one of the world’s largest and most
powerful companies so long to free itself from the interference of an increasingly ineffective
state. Basic considerations arising from the difficulty of managing a transoceanic business
during wartime were certainly factors. The long tradition of ethnically German leadership in
Kompaniya Singer would not have helped Singer’s appearance of Russian loyalty. Despite these
hardships, Singer actively tried to restore its Russian company’s good name. Singer’s actions to
free itself from government suspicion, however, have largely been overlooked by historians.
Rather, historians looking at Kompaniya Singer’s sequestration have focused on the
imperial government’s missteps and misunderstandings of Singer. Benjamin Sawyer attributed
Singer’s difficulties to the government’s suspicion of its modern information gathering practices,
arguing that Singer’s foreign business practices were misunderstood in Russia’s less-developed
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economic sector. This foreignness was wrongly equated with Germanness.

31

Eric Lohr and

William C. Fuller Jr. mention Singer’s predicament as part of their larger narratives on the
overreach of Russian military suspicion and nationalization policies. While Singer was not the
only foreign company targeted by governmental and military powers, the size of Kompaniya
Singer’s business and the strength of the international Singer Manufacturing Company made its
sequestration a prime example of the overreach of Russian military and governmental
nationalization policies.32 Using Singer as an example, these historians have been among those
to argue that the Russian government increasingly turned against ethnic minorities during the
First World War.

These narratives shed light on the Russian government’s increasing

protectionism and nationalism, but they fail to grapple with the actions of Kompaniya Singer and
its employees. How did Singer respond to wartime nationalism, and how did its employees
frame the national identity of their company?
Sources from the Singer Manufacturing Company’s own records suggest that Singer and
its employees actively sought to defend their company and themselves by presenting Kompaniya
Singer as a distinctively Russian company. While Singer remained fundamentally multinational,
its leaders strove to present their Russian subsidiary as loyally and patriotically Russian. Despite
this effort, Singer’s self-conception and self-presentation of its Russianness were not always in
accord with rising ethnic Russian nationalism. The story of Singer’s sequestration is at its core a
clash between the emerging realities of nationalism and multinational industry. As one of the
first multinational companies, Singer was one of the first to navigate the waters between patriotic
duty and multinational commerce. Singer was fundamentally transnational and incapable of
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adopting the ethnically Russian (russkii) identity increasingly valued by the imperial Russian
government and business elite.

Instead, Singer attempted to project a non-ethnic Russian

(rossiiskii) identity.
Between 1915 and early 1917, Singer Manufacturing Company and Kompaniya Singer
employees worked through a variety of governmental and private avenues to combat their
company’s sequestration and assert its rossiiskii Russianness. In a time when even Russian-born
minorities were viewed warily, however, to what extent could Singer succeed? Singer’s actions
and reactions, successes and repeated failures reveal how Singer’s multinational identity and
nationally indifferent business practices prevented the company from easily or completely
exonerating itself in the face of government accusations.
Russian Singer before the War
When Singer entered Russia in the mid-nineteenth century, the country was openly
soliciting foreign industry and settlement. The first 355 Singer sewing machines entered the
Russian market between 1859 and 1861 through Singer’s agent in France, Charles Callebout.33
Although Russia does not seem to have been a priority for Callebout, it soon became one for the
New York-based Singer leadership. During the domestic turmoil of the American Civil War,
Singer turned to overseas markets to shore up its bottom line. 34 Russia, which boasted a large
population and no native sewing machine manufactures, was one such market. The company
entered Russia in earnest by contracting with a St. Petersburg merchant to sell its machines.
Under this merchant, Max Fiedler, Singer slowly expanded throughout the empire. 35
As the Singer Manufacturing Company expanded worldwide, it began to consolidate its
sales under direct, rather than contracted, control. In that vein, George Neidlinger, Singer’s
33
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general agent in Hamburg, took formal control of the Russian business in 1877. 36

Under

Neidlinger’s leadership, Singer’s Russian business greatly expanded. In under twenty years,
Neidlinger oversaw the creation of a vast Singer network across Russia. This network included
four central offices and over seventy-five retail stores reaching from Ukraine to Siberia.37 In
1895 alone, Neidlinger’s Russian Singer sold 68,788 sewing machines.38 Singer, a foreign
company, had become a significant force within the Russian sewing machine market. In 1897,
Singer’s Russian business was incorporated as a Russian company under Russian law. It was
named Kompaniya Singer. 39
Although Singer’s nineteenth-century success in the imperial Russian market owes much
to the innovation and work of Fiedler, Neidlinger, and Singer’s other employees, it would not
have been possible without the Russian government’s openness to foreign investment and
immigration. These early sales occurred amidst Russia’s nineteenth-century openness to foreign
immigrants and investments. The Great Reforms of the 1860s had opened Russian society to
new levels of internal mobility and openness to foreign immigration. Eric Lohr describes
Russia’s pre-World War I immigration and citizenship policies as an “attract and hold” model. 40
The Imperial Government realized that it had a vast country to settle and it solicited and
welcomed foreigners to become Russian subjects. These immigrants were incorporated into an
empire that, Lohr contends, embraced an assimilationist approach to Russian subjecthood. 41
They could become Russian.
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There were, of course, exceptions to this mobility and assimilation. Russian-subject Jews
were still infamously restricted to the Pale of Settlement, and foreign Jews were also prohibited
from settling in most parts of the empire.42 Ethnic Polish and Ukrainian regions were targeted
with what could be seen as Russification programs. 43 Even foreign Orthodox clergy members
were only admitted to the country in small numbers.44 The immigrants that Russia sought and
solicited were white westerners capable of bringing an economic boost to the country. Given
these ethnic and religious litmus tests to immigration, how ethnically and nationally indifferent
was the Russian Empire of the late nineteenth century?
Certainly, the imperial government did not ignore ethnicity, but neither did it envision
itself as a nation-state. While Theodore R. Weeks identified Russian nationalism within the
empire, especially on the Western boarders, from the mid-nineteenth century, he argues that the
imperial Russian government’s nationality policies were primarily reactionary. While
acknowledging that at times “the desire to equate Russia with the Great Russian nationality and
the Orthodox church was irresistible,” Weeks concludes that the empire was essentially nonnational.45 The Russian state, driven as it was by the desire to populate its land and build the
economy of its diverse empire, was acting out of pragmatism more than nationalism. Although
not all nations or ethnic groups were treated equally, nineteenth century Russia was far from a
nation-state.
To Western European businesses and businessmen, like Singer’s Neidlinger, the Russian
Empire was welcoming and accommodating. As part of the Great Reforms, Russia allowed
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foreign investors and businessmen to enjoy many of the rights of Russian subjects regardless of
whether they changed their state allegiances. Prior to the 1860s, foreigners would have received
substantial gains by seeking Russian subjecthood. After the Reforms, however, foreigners could
join professional guilds, make long-term investments, and even will their assets to their
descendants.46 Singer executives and employees were able to run Singer’s Russian business
without being or becoming Russian, and many retained their foreign citizenship. Neidlinger
oversaw both German and Russian sales from his German office until 1902, and he remained a
German subject. 47 In this he was not alone.
Starting in 1902, Kompaniya Singer was administered from within Russia, yet its
leadership remained foreign. Albert Flohr, a member of Kompaniya Singer’s board of directors
and a German subject, served as sales director from 1902 until 1915.48 Walter F. Dixon, an
American citizen and another of the Kompaniya Singer board of directors, managed the building
and operation of Singer’s Podolsk factory beginning in 1900. 49

Together, Flohr and Dixon

oversaw over 30,000 workers in the Russian Empire at the start of World War I. 50 While Singer
strove for local managers and employees, many of its Russian staff were foreign born or drawn
from imperial ethnic minorities. On the sales side, these employees were spread throughout a
vast network of fifty central sales offices across the empire. These central offices, each run by
an agent, were generally located in urban areas. Each central office managed several smaller
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offices, called depots.51 At Podolsk, Dixon managed 5,614 factory staff and laborers in 1914.
Most, but not all, of Dixon’s employees were ethnically Russian. 52
In 1914, Dixon and Flohr sat atop an expansive and ethnically diverse Kompaniya Singer
network. While Singer’s size was noteworthy, its multiethnic and foreign character was not
unusual. One study found that only about a third of corporate managers in 1905 were ethnically
Russian, while 10.5 percent were foreigners. These numbers include only businesses, like
Kompaniya Singer, chartered within Russia. Inclusion of foreign enterprises, which generally
employed foreign managers, would have increased this percentage.53

Foreign and ethnic

minority managers were common among Russian companies during the long nineteenth century,
yet they decreased markedly by the first year of World War I. The same study found that only
5.7 percent of corporate managers in 1914 were foreigners. 54

Why had this percentage

plummeted?
The general decrease may have had many causes, of course, but the outbreak of war
exacerbated and heightened the effects.

The “attract and hold” immigration policies of early

days were quickly abandoned by the imperial government, and foreign allegiances became
suspect.55 The government did not just harden its stance toward foreigners, however. Eric Lohr
has argued that, while the empire may have been ethnically assimilationist before World War I,
the war provoked increasingly nationalistic sentiment in both the imperial government and the
business sector. 56 Both the government and the business elite increasingly favored ethnically
Russian industry and investment. According to Ruth AmEnde Roosa’s detailed study, the
51
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Petrograd-based Association of Industry and Trade was initially accepting of foreign
involvement and foreign industrial growth within Russia. Thomas Owen and Eric Lohr’s
analyses of the Moscow merchant organizations conclude that these Russian industrialists were
increasingly and overtly nationalistic. Despite these differences between the groups, all three
authors conclude that the start of World War I increased the influence of ethnically Russian,
russkii nationalism within Russian industry. 57 The War facilitated the imperial government’s
embrace of the ethnic Russian identity increasingly propagated by Moscow’s growing Russian
business class.58 Before the war, in other words, governmental Russianness had been a rossiiskii
construct while the wartime climate favored a more ethnically dependent russkii identity.
Kompaniya Singer’s wartime interactions with representatives of the government reveal
the extent to which Singer’s conception of Russianness diverged from the government’s
emerging ideal of ethnically Russian nationalism. To the imperial government, non-Russian
nationality implied non-Russian loyalties. Singer attempted to conform to the government’s
expectations of Russianness, but its multinational character made this adjustment impossible to
execute fully. Rather, Singer’s leaders attempted to adapt to the growing nationalist sentiment
by crafting a Russian national identity that retained the rossiiskii national indifference of the
earlier period, while integrating the patriotism of the war era.
War and Kompaniya Singer’s German Problem
As the government came to equate Russian ethnicity with Russian nationalism, this
equation brought with it the assumption that German ethnicity implied German nationalism and
German patriotism.

Kompaniya Singer’s historical connections to Germany and ethnically
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German leadership made both the company’s stores and its employees targets of suspicion.
Within a month of the declaration of war, the Russian Imperial Army and governmental leaders
were planning for the deportation of Germans from the western borderlands to the interior of the
empire.59 The enemy aliens first targeted were men enrolled in enemy military reserves, but
soon all able-bodied foreigners of military age residing in the empire were susceptible to
deportation. As Lohr and other historians have noted, this deportation of civilians as prisoners of
war was a break from previous wartime practices.60 Foreign nationality became equated with
loyalty to foreign states, and civilians were viewed as potential government agents.
Kompaniya Singer’s interactions with the imperial government in the early stages of the
war reveal the extent to which the government’s understanding of loyalty to the empire became
aligned with ethnic Russian identity, or at least against perceived enemy national identities. In
this context, nationality began to complicate the skill and experience concerns that had guided
Kompaniya Singer’s staffing decisions. Individuals could no longer be seen simply as skilled
workers; they were also increasingly labelled by nationality.
A small but significant number of the employees on Kompaniya Singer’s payroll at the
outbreak of war were German. By Kompaniya Singer’s 1915 figures, at the start of the First
World War the company employed 131 subjects of enemy nations. While a comparatively small
portion of the company’s more than 30,000 employees, many of these men occupied important
positions.61 Among the 13 subjects of enemy states working in the Moscow headquarters were
Kompaniya Singer’s chief bookkeeper, Willy Rutencratz; superintendent of organization, Kuno
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Ganzel; and manager of manufacturing, Karl Klein. 62 In addition, at least eight of Kompaniya
Singer’s central office agents were also German or Austrian subjects. 63 From a total of only fifty
central offices, these eight agents constituted a significant portion of Kompaniya Singer’s middle
management. The presence of these German managers reflects what Singer historian Fred V.
Carstensen called a “distinct pattern” of appointing German and western European employees to
positions of responsibility within Kompaniya Singer. 64
This dependence on German management was typical throughout the empire prior to
World War I. Thomas Owen assessed that in 1914 over 20 percent of corporate managers in the
Russian Empire were ethnic Germans, either German or Russian subjects.65 This number is
startling considering that, per the 1897 imperial census, only about 1.5 percent of the Russian
population spoke German as a first language. 66 Germans and other employees from more
industrialized nations had knowledge and skills that were lacking in the Russian workforce.67 For
Kompaniya Singer, which had originated through Neidlinger’s German offices, there was a
legacy of German connections further facilitating the recruitment of German and Germanspeaking employees. Before the War, Singer’s outposts in Germany and Russia had routine
communication and exchange. This nationally indifferent hiring and promotion of skilled
workers, while not atypical in the prewar era, became a liability for Kompaniya Singer in 1914.
Singer executives in New York were aware of the practical and apparent problems
inherent in Kompaniya Singer’s German-speaking workforce. As early as October 8, 1914,
62

Ibid.; Affidavits of Karl Klein, Willy Rutencrantz, Kuno Ganzel, box 155, folder 2, Singer Mss.
Flohr to Alexander, Oct. 17, 1914, European Trip – Russia – 1914, box 155, folder 9, Singer Mss.
64
Carstensen, American Enterprise in Foreign Markets, 60.
65
Owen, Russian Corporate Capitalism, 72.
66
The census recorded 1,790,489 native German speakers, out of a total population of 125,640,021. “Pervaya
vseobschaya perepis’ Naceleniya Rossiiskoi’ Imperii 1897 g.,” Demoskop Weekly,
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php. For further discussion of the German population as recorded in
1897, see Ingeborg Fleischhauer, “The Germans’ Role in Tsarist Russia: A Reappraisal,” in The Soviet Germans:
Past and Present, by Ingeborg Fleishhauer and Benjamin Pinkus (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1986), 13-18.
67
Carstensen, American Enterprise in Foreign Markets, 60.
63

25

Singer Manufacturing Company President Douglas Alexander asked Kompaniya Singer’s Sales
Director, Albert Flohr, about the situation of Kompaniya Singer’s German employees. 68 Likely
not understanding the extent of the Russian government’s plans for relocation, Alexander wrote
of his hope that three Moscow-based German employees had “not suffered too much
inconvenience.” Alexander’s hopes notwithstanding, two of the employees named in his letter
were deported by the Russian government to the interior provinces by October 17. The third was
removed the middle of December. These employees were not the only Singer employees
interned by the Russian government. Eight of the company’s central office agents had also been
deported by mid-October.69

To the government, each foreigner within the country was a

potential threat. As recorded by Singer President Douglas Alexander, Minister of Foreign
Affairs Sergei Sazonov told Alexander and Dixon in a 1915 meeting that Singer’s pre-war
employment of, by his count, 125 German subjects meant that Singer had employed “125 spies
or potential spies.”70 While the veracity of Alexander’s narration is questionable, Singer’s
executives were clearly under the impression that the imperial government equated national
identity with loyalty to a state. To continue their business in Russia, Singer attempted to meet
the government’s standard of Russianness. Singer fired its German subjects and even some of its
ethnically German employees.71
As the imperial government continued to equate Germanness with disloyalty to the
Russian Empire, its conception of Russianness became increasingly defined by ethnicity. As has
been mentioned, German subjects and ethnic Germans were over represented in the late imperial
elite. In the government’s ethnically based understanding of Russianness, these individuals were
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no longer considered loyal subjects of the tsar. Rather, the allegiance of a large and influential
population within the empire had been called into question. However, unlike the Poles or
regional intelligentsias, who Theodore Weeks identifies as two of the chief targets of late
nineteenth century Russian nationalism, ethnic Germans were deeply embedded in the imperial
leadership.72 Thus, the government suspicion of this once privileged group marked a dramatic
change in the imperial understanding of Russianness. Singer attempted to respond to this ethnic
Russification. The company fired its German-subject employees, and even some ethnically
German subjects of the tsar. These actions were the limit of Singer’s ability to embrace ethnic
Russianness.
Especially problematic for Singer’s Russian identity was Kompaniya Singer’s sales
director, Albert Flohr. Flohr oversaw Singer’s vast sales organization, and this Germanness did
not escape notice by the government. As deportations continued, Flohr’s position in Moscow
was increasingly tenuous in late 1914 and early 1915. At the same time that the first of
Kompaniya Singer’s German employees was sent to the interior provinces, Flohr appealed to the
Russian government for a “concession” which would allow him to remain at his post in
Moscow.73 Having suffered a stroke in 1905 and never having fully recovered, Flohr would not
have been considered a candidate for the German army. 74 Potential military mobilization was an
important factor in the early deportations to the Russian interior, and Flohr’s health excluded him
from German military service. Noting his incapacitation, the Russian government granted Flohr
an exemption from the deportation order. While this exemption seems to imply a pragmatism
and national indifference in governmental actions, it was only a brief respite for Flohr.
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conflict between Flohr’s nationality and the government’s increasingly narrow definition of
loyalty and Russianness became apparent only a few months later.
Flohr’s Germanness was soon noted by newly introduced and nationally motivated
government inspectors. These network of inspectors, which became a thorn in Kompaniya
Singer’s side, was instituted by the imperial government in March 1915. The government
decreed that inspectors could be deployed to oversee the operations of companies formed under
Russian law.

This decree gave the government sweeping power to counter the economic

activities of foreign subjects within the empire. It stated that:
the Minister of Finances appoints special Government Inspectors to supervise the
operations of Stock Companies or Stock Societies formed under Russian Laws, in those
cases when among the Stockholders or Management are subjects of the States at war with
Russia or when there is ground for suspicion as to the real transfer of the stock or
management into the hands of Russian subjects or the subjects of friendly or neutral
nations, of Partnership associations, full or in trust, in the membership of which there are,
or were prior to the war, enemy aliens and of Commercial-industrial undertakings
belonging wholly to enemy aliens living in Russia.75

At the heart of this decree was the assumption that subjects of enemy nations posed a threat to
the Russian Empire and that loyalties of these individuals opposed imperial Russian interests.
Kompaniya Singer was a legally Russian company, yet the mandate of these inspectors treated
Singer and Flohr as potential enemies of the Russian state.
The conflict between Flohr’s citizenship and the new law was swiftly brought to the
attention of Kompaniya Singer. In the same month that this decree was propagated, Alexander
Gouriev, a state advisor, sent a notice to Kompaniya Singer’s Petrograd representative
expressing dismay that Flohr was still “managing the whole [Kompaniya Singer] enterprise.”
Gouriev informed the company that he was submitting a report to the imperial government in
which Kompaniya Singer was used as an “example of evasions of the law and decisions by
75
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Germans, contrary to the objects and intentions of the Government.” While this letter was
ostensibly sent to afford Singer the chance to correct any misinformation, the author also stressed
the urgency of removing Flohr from the operations of Kompaniya Singer. 76 Flohr’s German
birth had become a distinct problem for Singer. Regardless of his skill and experience in leading
Kompaniya Singer’s sales operations, Flohr was now a clear liability. He could no longer
effectively run Kompaniya Singer.
Singer would later claim that Flohr had resigned a month before Gouriev wrote to
Singer’s offices.77 Based on Flohr’s correspondence, however, it seems more likely that he
remained in his position until at least the middle of March.78 His removal likely came around the
same time that the government instituted its policy of government inspectors. Singer understood
that the government’s campaign against German nationals would not have allowed Flohr to
remain in his position much longer. By removing Flohr, Singer removed a major obstacle to its
relationship with the government and its Russian identity.
Flohr’s removal did not put an end to Singer’s problems, however. By this time, Singer
had already been branded as a potentially disloyal, German corporation and the removal of one
man, even a man in leadership, could not remove this stigma. On the contrary, Singer’s situation
only worsened.

Shortly after Flohr’s departure, a government inspector was appointed to

oversee the operations of Kompaniya Singer. 79 Singer, it seems, was on the government’s watch
list with or without Flohr.
Kompaniya Singer attracted the attention of not only government bureaucrats, but also
military officials. On June 6, 1915, army officer Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich led searches of over
76
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500 Singer branches in the Petrograd military district. Historian William C. Fuller, Jr. has called
this search and the subsequent closure of Singer’s offices “the most extreme example of
Bruevich’s inquisitorial zeal.”80 If this was an inquisition, its target was suspected German spies.
The searches and closures of Singer stores near the imperial capital led to searches throughout
the empire, from Kiev to Irkutsk. 81 The military, like the bureaucracy, had equated non-Russian
ethnicities with foreign allegiances. Flohr’s resignation and the internment of enemy aliens had
not ended Singer’s perceived Germanness.
In August 1915, Kompaniya Singer was brought before a commission formed from the
All-Russia Zemstvo and Town Associations (Zemgor) to elucidate its national and patriotic
loyalties. The Zemgor found Kompaniya Singer to be free from German loyalties, but the
imperial government’s Finance Ministry continued to require government inspectors to oversee
Singer’s Russian operations. These inspectors were not removed until the fall of the tsarist
government in 1917.82 Until that time, the governmental bureaucracy and the military continued
to view Singer with suspicion.
Singer had attempted to adjust to the government’s increasingly russkii nationalism by
voluntarily removing German employees, but its multinational business model and perspective
made it impossible for Singer to either understand or implement this ethnic nationalism fully.
While not explicitly contradicting the governmental association of nationality with loyalty,
Kompaniya Singer adopted additional self-defense strategies that suggested an understanding
that loyalty to the empire was derived from choices and actions—legal constructs, cultural

80

Fuller, Foe Within, 166.
Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire, 80; N.S. Kirmel', "Germanskie Shpiony Torgovali v Sibiri Shveinymi
Mashinkami 'Zinger,'" Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal no. 4 (2002): 50.
82
“Protocol of the Commission of the All-Russian Zemstvo and Town Associations”; Memorial of the Singer
Manufacturing Company as to its Business in Russia, Dec. 13, 1916, box 155, folder 1, Singer Mss; Davies,
Peacefully Working to Conquer the World, 307.
81

30

assimilation, and utility to the empire—rather than from an innate or perceived ethnic
nationality. These defense strategies—the only left to Kompaniya Singer—served to cement a
rossiiskii identity rather than the russkii identity valued by the government.
Legal Russianness
From the start of the war, Kompaniya Singer executives devoted great attention to the
legal nationalities of their employees and their company. Since the adoption of its 1897 Russian
charter, Kompaniya Singer was a legally Russian entity not simply an outpost of its American
parent company.

83

Kompaniya Singer viewed itself as a legally Russian institution. Singer’s

leadership was content to remove Albert Flohr from power, because they understood that having
a legally German subject in control of Kompaniya Singer’s sales division would not support
Singer’s Russian identity. They failed to understand, however, that legal considerations did not
alleviate ethnic concerns.
The founders and directors of Kompaniya Singer were legally able to incorporate a
Russian company, but they were not ethnically Russian. According to the company’s charter,
they included a German subject, an American citizen, and a British subject. 84 During the First
World War, Singer removed any officials holding “enemy” citizenships.

After Flohr’s

resignation, Kompaniya Singer claimed that its board of directors was made of one British
subject, two American citizens, and two Russian subjects.85 While these legal citizenships
should not have been problematic, they do not tell the whole, multinational story. The British
subject was Singer Manufacturing Company President Douglas Alexander.

Despite his

citizenship, he lived in New York and ran an American multinational enterprise. One of the
Americans, Walter Dixon, the director of Singer’s Russian factory, was a naturalized citizen,
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having been born British. 86 One of the Russian subjects, Heinrich Bertling, had changed his
citizenship from German to Russian in order to facilitate his business dealings in Russia. 87 The
other Russian listed, Otto Myslik, Flohr’s replacement as Russian sales director, may not have
even been a Russian subject.
The question of Myslik’s nationality provides a window into Singer’s reliance on legal
Russianness. While Myslik was labelled as a Russian subject, his biography exhibits a national
fluidity that make him difficult to define in national terms. While he is called a Russian subject
in 1915, in 1921 Myslik styled himself a “native and citizen of Czecho-Slovakia.”88 This
national identification fits with Myslik’s Czech surname. Some Austrian subjects of Slavic
ancestry were given permission to remain in Russia during the war due to appeals by Slavic
charitable organizations, and it could be that Myslik fell into this category. 89 Myslik was born in
the predominantly German-speaking city of Liberec, however, and he was born a subject of the
Austrian emperor. 90
The Singer leadership recognized early on the ambiguity of Myslik’s nationality and the
potential legal problem it entailed. Before the First World War, Myslik had been working for
Singer in Constantinople. After the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war, Myslik was
trapped in Odessa. Singer Manufacturing Company President Douglas Alexander requested that
Flohr find a position for Myslik in Russia. Despite his stated desire to retain Myslik within
Singer’s employ, Alexander urged Flohr to appoint Myslik only provided “there are no
objections by reason of the question of nationality or otherwise." 91 Perhaps in recognition of
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Myslik’s precarious national position, Flohr and Alexander rejected Myslik’s request to receive
his mail in Singer’s Moscow office.

92

Myslik’s migration and ambiguous legal and ethnic

identity were recognized as a potential problem for Singer, yet he was an improvement over the
German Flohr. On paper, at least, Myslik was Russian.
Myslik’s Russian subjecthood made him a rossiiskii Russian, but it did not ease ethnic
concerns. By maintaining that Myslik’s legal status made him sufficiently Russian to head
Kompaniya Singer’s sales division, Singer failed to engage the government’s increasing ethnic
nationalism. While Flohr’s legal Germanness undermined his utility to Singer, the company
asserted the legal Russianness of Myslik and his fellow board member Heinrich Bertling. The
Germanic names of these Singer executives, however, would not have eased the Russian
government’s fears. While Myslik and Bertling may have been legally Russian, and in Myslik’s
case even that seems complicated, they were not ethnic Russians. They fit the rossiiskii, but not
the russkii mold of Russianness. For Singer, this legality was adequate. Myslik was a good
employee, who was legally qualified to lead the company, and Singer’s executives saw no need
to replace him. For the Russian government officials, however, Myslik did not Russify
Kompaniya Singer sufficiently to remove the company from suspicion. He was not sufficiently
russkii.
The disjunction between these rossiiskii and russkii presentations of Russianness were
brought to the fore in Kompaniya Singer’s defense before the Zemgor. In August 1915, a
commission of officials from the Zemgor met in Singer’s Podolsk factory to assess Singer’s
national and patriotic loyalties.93 Throughout the summer, Singer’s leaders and shop employees
had attempted to fight off local sequestrations and business interruptions. The meeting with the
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Zemgor was a chance to finally clear Kompaniya Singer’s name with the imperial government.
The eight-man commission included, among a variety of local politicians and bureaucrats, the
leaders of both the All-Russia Zemstvo Association and the All-Russia Towns Association.
Singer chose Podolsk manager Walter Dixon and factory engineer A.A. Miliukoff to plead its
case. As a member of Kompaniya Singer’s board of directors, Dixon may seem like an obvious
choice. Tellingly, however, Kompaniya Singer did not choose either of its other Russian-based
board members.

By excluding Myslik and Bertling from this meeting, Singer may have

implicitly acknowledged the problematic aspects of their ethnicities.

As a British-born

American, Dixon did not carry linguistic and ethnic connections to Russia’s wartime enemies.
The same could not be said for his fellow board members.
Although he could not be easily labelled as an enemy alien, Dixon was still not Russian.
In its defense before the Zemgor, Singer sought to mitigate Dixon’s foreignness. During the
commission’s proceedings, Singer leaned upon the Russification of Walter Dixon. Dixon was
listed in the proceedings before the Zemgor by his American name, Walter Frank Dixon, but also
by his Russian-styled name and patronymic, Vassily Vassilievitch. Moreover, the details of the
proceedings state that “the committee could not but draw attention to the fact that W.F. Dixon,
during the 20 years he has resided in Russia, has fully mastered the Russian language, which he
employs to perfection.”94 Dixon’s wife was Russian, and he had lived in the country since
1895.95 These same things, however, could likely have been said for many of Kompaniya
Singer’s German and ethnically German leaders.

In his study of St. Petersburg’s ethnic

Germans, Anders Henriksson found a trend of assimilation and national indifference prior to the
First World War.
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ethnicity.” 96 In the nationalistic fervor of 1915, however, Kompaniya Singer’s presentation of a
Russified American to the Russian authorities, rather than a Russified German, may be an
acknowledgment of the limits of national mutability in wartime. Singer declined the opportunity
to paint any of its ethnically German representatives as assimilated Russians. Nonetheless,
Kompaniya Singer’s obvious pride in the Russian assimilation of Dixon, a British subject turned
American citizen, speaks to its conception of nationalities that are attainable, not ethnic or innate.
Utilitarian and Patriotic Russianness
In addition to stressing the legal standing of its operation, Singer presented itself before
the Zemgor as a useful component of the Russian economy and war effort. To the Singer
leadership, Kompaniya Singer’s utility made it patriotic. This patriotism implied loyalty and
Russianness. By stressing Singer’s importance to the war effort and Russian economy, however,
Singer highlighted the extent of Russian reliance on foreign industry and investment. Rather
than assuage the concerns of the Russian government, the importance of Singer may have given
new cause for suspicion.
Despite the possible downfalls of highlighting Singer’s size and scope, Kompaniya
Singer’s wartime utility was an obvious way for Singer executives to show the company’s
loyalty to Russia. This approach is curious, however, because Russian industry in general had
great difficulty in wartime coordination with the government. As Ruth AmEnde Roosa explains,
before spring 1915, the government had shortages of war supplies due to its failure to incorporate
industry into war production. Throughout the course of 1915, the political clashes between
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industry and the government continued to prevent effective mobilization of Russia’s industrial
might for the war effort.97
Despite the government’s ineffective use of industry, the Zemgor expected Singer to
contribute to Russia’s war effort and questioned Dixon about those contributions. In reply,
Dixon emphasized the five-million-ruble defense orders being processed by the Podolsk factory
and the company’s willingness to do more.98 The war supplies manufactured by Singer are not
described in the record, but a few months later, Douglas Alexander warned Minister of Foreign
Affairs Sergei Sazonov, that Singer’s continued sequestration would prevent the company from
supplying sewing machines to the government or “to contractors who are engaged in the
manufacture of military clothing and accoutrements.”99 Kompaniya Singer took obvious pride in
its war production and in the recognition afforded by the imperial government. At its 1916
shareholders meeting, Kompaniya Singer boasted that a local government committee had found
that 86% of Singer’s Podolsk production had been for imperial defense and that an imperial
general had praised Singer for its factory’s “substantial assistance to the work for the defense” of
the empire.100
While benefiting monetarily from war contracts, Kompaniya Singer and the Singer
Manufacturing Company viewed their commitment to the war effort as an important mark of
their Russianness and even expended their resources to bolster this image.

The company

contributed money to the war effort primarily through its support for the families of its employee
soldiers. By late August 1914, the imperial government had mobilized 6,000 Kompaniya Singer
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employees for military action.101 As Peter Gatrell explains, the government provided payments
to the families of these soldiers. Many Russians, however, saw these payments as too low in
comparison to the profits they believed industrialists and shopkeepers were making. 102 This
impression, joined by patriotism and duty, prompted companies to supplement the incomes of
their conscripted workers’ families. Kompaniya Singer joined their ranks. On August 21, 1914,
Alexander approved Flohr’s request to allocate 150,000 rubles to aid the families of its
uniformed employees over the course of three months.103 By May 1916, Kompaniya Singer had
given 793,505.67 rubles to the families of its soldier employees.104 Although cash constraints
caused Singer to reduce these payments during the closure crisis of the summer of 1915, there
was no discussion of ending them.105 These payments tied Singer to the empire. Not only was
the company contributing to the war effort in order to profit from military contracts, but also it
was performing what it saw was its patriotic “duty to give assistance to the families of employees
on active service.”106 Kompaniya Singer saw and presented itself as a Russian company, and that
Russianness demanded these sorts of patriotic actions.
Despite Singer’s legal status and display of patriotic utility, however, the Singer
executives in Moscow and New York were unable to free their company from suspicion and
government oversight.

Government officials repeatedly confirmed the importance of

Kompaniya Singer’s legal Russian identity and thanked Singer for its wartime production, but
they did not remove their inspectors. The Russianness that Singer presented and attempted to
embody was not ethnically national enough to be seen as benign. Singer’s actions remained
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suspect, and Singer’s willingness to engage foreign and multinational connections in its battle
with Russian officials was especially problematic.
Multinational Russianness
To bolster its image of utility, the Singer Manufacturing Company called upon its vast
multinational network. Douglas Alexander and Walter Dixon leveraged their respective British
and American citizenships to seek the aid of those countries’ ambassadors and foreign service
leaders. While in Russia in 1915 attempting to free his company from government interference,
Singer Manufacturing Company President Douglas Alexander gave an interview to a Russian
newspaper in which he gave the perspective of an “American financier” on the European war.107
At Alexander’s behest, J.P. Morgan telegraphed the Russian Imperial Minister of Finance
affirming the Singer Manufacturing Company’s status as “one of the largest and most influential
industrial companies in the United States.” 108 While these actions were no doubt meant to
marshal these international forces in support of Singer, they highlight Singer’s foreignness.
Why would highlighting foreign associations with friendly or neutral powers harm Singer’s
Russian defense?

The answer to this question lies in the increasing national unease with

Russia’s dependence on foreign industry. Eric Lohr has argued that wartime nationalists in the
Russian Empire saw themselves as victims of German and foreign dominance (zasil’e).
Nationalistic rhetoric from business organizations and the imperial government presented a
Russian Empire that was controlled by foreign interests.109 While Singer’s conception of its own
Russianness could coexist with a multinational identity, the Russian nationalists’ conception of
Russianness could not.
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From early 1915, Singer executives consistently used American and British diplomatic
channels to plead their case to the Russian government, which added to Singer’s foreign
appearance. In April 1915, the American consul-general in Moscow, John Snodgrass, certified
the American and British character of the Singer Manufacturing Company. 110 Singer executives,
particularly Alexander and Dixon, repeatedly reached out to the American ambassador and the
United States Department of State. Even before the closure of Singer’s stores, Dixon appealed to
US Ambassador George Marye for assistance in freeing Kompaniya Singer from government
inspection. 111 Between August 1915 and May 1916, Singer executives in New York wrote to
the U.S. Department of State in regards to their Russian business at least six times. 112 When
Alexander visited Russia in the fall of 1915, he met with the American ambassador before
meeting with any Russian government officials. 113

Although Alexander found Ambassador

Marye ineffective, an opinion seconded by some historians, the Singer leadership did not
abandon their pursuit of diplomatic intervention.114
Alexander, a British subject, also reached out to the British diplomatic service. In his
October 27, 1915 appeal to British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan, Douglas Alexander
stressed the British capital, British debt, and British trading relationship of Kompaniya Singer.
Alexander suggested that the British government should seek to help Kompaniya Singer since
the Singer factory at Clydebank, Scotland sold supplies and products to the Russian business. 115
While Alexander clearly intended to appeal to wartime patriotism and alliances through his
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appeal to British authorities, these international appeals may have been interpreted differently
within Russia.
Dixon and Alexander’s willingness to use diplomatic channels to assist the Russian
Singer company highlights the fundamental divide between Singer’s conception of Russianness
and the Russianness espoused by the government, namely, the multinational character of the
Singer Manufacturing Company. From their earliest appeals to foreign powers, Kompaniya
Singer executives framed their requests in terms of the importance of the Singer Manufacturing
Company to multiple states—Great Britain, the United States, and the Russian Empire. Building
on Singer's conception of Russianness as a matter of legality, utility, and patriotic allegiance, the
company's executives sought the help of their foreign friends to affirm Singer’s usefulness and
legitimacy.

Rather than substantiate the Russianness of Singer, however, these international

appeals solidified Singer's essential foreignness. To proponents of ethnic Russianness, Singer’s
multinational connections implied Russia’s dominance by foreign interests.

J.P. Morgan’s

assurance that Singer was important to the American economy, for instance, likely affirmed the
threat of international dominance in Russian industry more than it legitimized Kompaniya
Singer. These international connections represented foreign loyalties and undermined whatever
ethnic Russianness may have been implied through Singer’s claims about the cultural
assimilation of its leading employees. The Singer executives were presenting an image of
Russianness that was not in conflict with multinationalism and this image was quite different
from the ethnic Russianness of nationalists and the imperial government.
Defining Wartime Russianness
These contrasting understandings of Russianness draw attention to the essential difficulty
in defining nationalities. While the imperial government and Singer both aspired to Russianness,
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they had fundamentally different interpretations of the meaning of the term. While Singer’s
Russianness may have favored with the nineteenth-century imperial rossiiskii identity, it was
insufficiently ethnic by the national standards of World War I. During the early years of the
twentieth-century, imperial Russian society was in the midst of reimagining and redefining
Russianness. This national evolution would bridge the transition from a generally nationally
indifferent empire to the Soviet Union’s counterintuitive emphasis on national identity under a
supranational communist ideology.
Singer’s World War I Russianness, however, was not identical to the earlier imperial
national indifference.

Rather, Singer’s attempt at Russian identity was imagined within a

multinational and multistate framework. While the Russian Empire incorporated many ethnic
groups, it saw these loyalties as inferior to Russian citizenship. Singer, on the other hand, saw its
Russianness as a component of its multinational character.

Singer’s primary goals were

successful multinational commerce and profit. Cooperation with the Russian government was
fundamentally a means to this end. This national indifference places not only ethnic but also
citizenship loyalties below business objectives.
The diverging national understandings of Singer and the Russian imperial government
speak to the uneasy relationship between multinational identity and state governments. The
Singer Manufacturing Company, as a multinational enterprise, would never have been able to
achieve fully the ethnic Russianness advocated by Russian nationalists. The company’s survival
and profit depended on a supranational administrative structure and the subordination of national
loyalty to corporate loyalty.

While multinational firms may tailor their staff, systems, or

advertising to the culture or national identity of a population, their transnational business model
demands that they retain an element of national indifference. For governments that equate
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nationality with loyalty, however, the power and national opportunism of these multinational
corporations will remain a problem. Multinational corporations are often accused of spreading a
globalized or nationally indifferent culture at the expense of a national one. Kompaniya Singer’s
promotion of a nationally indifferent Russianness may substantiate this claim. The success of
ethnic Russian nationalists in challenging Singer’s conception of Russian identity, however,
complicates this narrative of globalization. In this case, the multinational company was pushed
back and stymied by an emergent ethnic nationalism.
Finally, Singer’s failure to create a Russianness that would satisfy the government raises
a question: To what extent did the Singer executives know that the Russian identity they were
generating was at odds with the Russian government’s conception of Russianness? Singer was
certainly attempting to convince the government of its loyalty and utility, and this investigation
has proceeded under the general assumption that Singer attempted to embody the government’s
conception of Russianness. Because of Singer’s multinational objectives and foreign origin,
however, this embodiment was impossible and undesirable.

From within their nationally

indifferent corporate structure, did Singer executives realize that their trappings of Russianness
failed to meet the government’s nationalistic standards of Russianness? Many of Singer’s
executives lived distinctly non-national lives. Employees like Dixon and Bertling changed their
citizenships to advance their business objectives, while Alexander, Myslik, and Flohr lived in
various foreign countries to facilitate their careers.
examples of Zahra’s national indifference.

These employees seem to be perfect

For many of Singer’s employees, their career

ambitions and Singer itself were more important factors in their identity than was nationality or
ethnicity.

Viewing their situations through the lens of corporate loyalty and national

indifference, Singer’s leaders approached Russianness very differently than did the government.

42

Chapter 3
Company Men during the Revolution
While Kompaniya Singer’s multinational associations were a liability during the early
years of the First World War, this same transnational character became a useful asset for the
company’s employees during and after the Russian Revolution. As life within the former Russian
Empire devolved into uncertainty in 1917, the Singer Manufacturing Company became a
powerful ally for many of Kompaniya Singer’s employees.

Although Singer employees

experienced the revolutions and Civil war from different geographic and social positions,
Singer’s transnational networks and the help they could offer drew many employees into close
relationships with the company. These employees came to rely on Singer. Although they may
not have used the term, they became company men.
The concept of a company man has gained a negative connotation, yet Singer’s
employees did not see their association with the company in negative terms. Scholarly profiles of
company men have focused on the submission and unexamined obedience of the employee, but
the experiences of Singer’s employees reveal a different sort of corporate loyalty.

While

company men have traditionally been portrayed as blind followers of a powerful and possibly
malevolent corporation, Singer’s employees chose to align with Singer as an ally and helpmate
in the face of the malevolence they perceived in the rising Soviet state. Rather than an inhibitor
of individuality and freedom, Singer was perceived by its company men as an aid in their own
liberation.
This image of an employer as a liberating force is very different from the customary
image of submissive company man, which reached its zenith at the height of the Cold War. The
company man originated as a moniker for loyal company employees in the early 1900s. By the
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1920s, the term had been adopted by union leaders of the as a slur against suspected managerial
spies or workers who neglected their own best interest in favor of their employers. 116 To some
extent, these early company men were viewed as stooges. Unable to realize their own best
interests, they latched on to a company that, so the union members thought, was abusive or
exploitative. In the 1950s, the view of company men shifted, though it did not become more
positive. In a widely circulated book, William H. Whyte, Jr. famously reduced the company man
to a blindly following and dependent “organization man.” For Whyte, the “organization man”
represented a fearfully conformist and uninspired paper pusher. Large military-industrial
corporations of the post-World War II era (Whyte mentions such giants as DuPont and
Lockheed.) needed legions of white-collar professionals to further their corporate objectives, and
their ranks were filled with organization men. Such employees were content to enter a company
in their twenties, rise through its ranks, and retire without pushing the limits of conformity. They
were modern, bureaucratic middlemen, who Whyte holds in negative comparison to earlier
American entrepreneurs motivated by the American Dream and the “Protestant work ethic.”

117

In a post-World War II society in which totalitarian ideologies seemed poised to strip away
individual freedoms, companies and corporations became yet one more behemoth institution
eclipsing the individual.
For the company men of Kompaniya Singer, however, individuality and individual
freedom were instrumental in their decision to remain company men. Many employees chose to
stay tied to Singer during the Russian Civil War, because they saw the multinational corporation
as an avenue to freedom. The experiences of several such employees were recorded in affidavits
given to Singer between 1920 and 1934. These affidavits, as well as correspondence between
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Singer’s management, reveal the liberating potential and the hardships of being Singer company
men.
Although each employee’s story recounts the Russian Revolution and the Civil War, the
challenges faced by the employees varied widely by place and time. Before the First World War,
Singer’s sales network had reached from Poland in the west to Vladivostok in the east. World
War I wreaked havoc on many of Singer’s Polish and Ukrainian shops, but the rest of the
Company’s network continued, somewhat worse for wear, into the two revolutions of 1917.
Historians have written of the piecemeal nationalization of Kompaniya Singer, which drove the
company to leave Soviet Russia entirely by 1924 and sustain losses of over $100 million, but
they have devoted little attention to varied plights of the 30,000 Kompaniya Singer employees
that participated in or fought against this confiscation. Across the former Russian Empire,
Singer’s employees faced different armies, different climates, different corporate infrastructures,
and different types of revolutionary fervor in a variety of locales. For these men and women, the
demise and nationalization of Kompaniya Singer were more important in their details than in
their summation.

In these varied situations, Singer’s company men needed and received

different sorts of aid and support.
There was much that Singer could offer to its company men. In the vignettes that follow, this
chapter investigates the patterns of crisis and action that marked these employees’ revolutionary
and wartime experiences. They were not simply conformist company men, but individually
motivated employees caught in the tumultuously modern chaos of the Russian Revolution and
Civil War. Amid violent uncertainty, the affidavit writers perceived tangible and empowering
benefits to be gained from retaining or deepening their connections to Singer’s transnational
network.
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Factory Workers and Management: Kazimierz Owczarski
While the traditional Marxist narrative of revolution is set in a factory, the events at
Singer’s Podolsk factory are rarely recounted in the employees’ affidavits. Only five of the
affidavit writers had worked at Podolsk. Three employees—Max Cruetzburg, Herman Bludeau,
and Wilhelm Brüggert—left the factory before the revolution. Ethnic Germans, each man had
been arrested early in the war and spent time interned in the Russian interior during World War I.
While their paths intersected with Kompaniya Singer after the War, they never returned to jobs at
the Russian factory. W.F. Dixon, the factory director, left Podolsk after offering the factory to
the Provisional Government. He travelled to Moscow, before leaving Russia for the United
States.118 Only one of the affidavit subjects, Kazimierz Owczarski, remained at the factory
during and after its nationalization. What was it that tied this small group of factory employees to
Singer during the revolution? How were they different from Singer’s other Podolsk employees?
Like the four other Podolsk affidavit subjects, Owczarski held a managerial role at the
factory; class played an important role in distinguishing the affidavit writers from the majority of
Singer’s Podolsk workforce.119 Conflict between workers and management had festered at
Podolsk since 1905. Consistent with that year’s general movements toward unionization and
political unrest in Russia, the Podolsk workers issued a set of demands to their superiors. These
demands included calls for reduced hours and increased pay. 120 Factory director Walker Dixon
wanted to compromise with some of these demands, but the New York Singer executives
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decided against compromise.121 Unable to reach an accord, the Podolsk workers went on strike
on November 30, 1905. Dixon closed the factory through the Moscow general strike of early
December.122 Despite Dixon’s attempts to sow goodwill after the strike, the chasm between
factory workers and management widened.123 Additional strikes followed in 1913 and 1915.124
Long before the First World War or the February Revolution, the Podolsk factory was rife with
conflict.
The upheaval of 1917 only furthered these conflicts between labor and management. In
June 1917, the factory directors were given a list of demands from a workers’ council. Although
this council claimed to represent all of Singer’s employees, both factory workers and sales staff,
the fallout from these demands would be most resounding at the Podolsk factory. Singer met
some of the workers’ demands, but management refused to accept all of the council’s
suggestions. Rather, the company decided to cease production in Russia. 125 On October 6,
Kompaniya Singer offered its factory to the Provisional Government for use in the war effort.
Singer stopped making sewing machines in Russia even before the Bolsheviks took control. 126
In 1920, the factory officially became the First Soviet State Sewing Machine Factory
(Glavshveimashin).127
Singer’s offer of the factory to the Provisional Government was likely seen as a
temporary fix. In the 1950s, Singer attempted to reclaim its losses in Russia through the United
States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), and the fate of the Podolsk factory
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features prominently in the claim. According to the claim, Kompaniya Singer leased the factory
to the Provisional Government for four months, ending in December 1917. By December, the
Bolsheviks had come to power. Hoping to secure Singer’s holdings, Myslik arranged with the
Soviet authorities to extend the government’s lease through September 1918. As the FCSC
claim explains, however, by September 1918 the factory was firmly in Soviet hands and “no
vestige of the Russian Company’s [Kompaniya Singer’s] ownership remained.” 128 The factory,
the only Russian-based manufacturer of sewing machines, was counted among Singer’s most
significant losses. Singer calculated its 1917 value as over $4 million dollars. 129
The Podolsk factory was obviously one of Singer’s most important possessions within
Russia, and for managers like Owczarski it represented opportunities for advancement.
Owczarski had worked at Podolsk since 1898.

Originally a mechanic, he rose to become

manager of the stand department and shipment of machines and parts at Podolsk. 130 While
factory workers would later reflect on their poor living quarters, Owczarski owned a “small
house” in the city. 131 In the socially stratified climate of Podolsk, Owczarski’s material wealth
and elevated position put him on the side of the management. After 1917, however, the Singer
management had clearly lost the battle of Podolsk. Owczarski remembered that, after the
factory’s nationalization, “any one [sic] who wished still to keep up his work in favour of the
enterprise came at once under suspicion and was thrown into prison and shot, and therefore
everyone was trying to keep away.” 132
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Owczarski and the four other Podolsk representatives among the affidavit subjects were
on the wrong side of a workers’ revolution. Equated with capitalistic management, they were
outcasts from the revolution. This disconnect between Singer’s management and workers has
been explored by geographer Mona Domosh, as she has investigated both the cultural
embeddedness of Singer’s leadership and the mechanisms of Singer’s sewing machine
production in Russia.

Domosh explains that, as early as 1906, Dixon separated himself

physically from his employees by housing his office in a building removed from the factory.
While acknowledging that it is impossible to know whether Dixon made this decision because of
the strikes, Domosh argues that “the enduring effect of the building was to denote and legitimize
hierarchical relationships between workers, low-level managers and staff, and Dixon himself.”133
The factory director eyed his employees with suspicion, but the experiences of Owczarski and
the other Podolsk affidavit writers suggest that Dixon was not alone. At least some of Dixon’s
direct subordinates also felt alienated from their workers.
Perhaps the best example of this class tension in the Singer factory is represented by
Owczarski’s house. Although Owczarski does not go into detail about his situation in Podolsk,
he does mourn the loss of his house. The house, which Owczarski says he “acquired after many
years hard work,” was taken by the Bolshevik authorities when he departed Russia. 134

To

Owczarski, this home was a symbol of his success, but for some workers who remained in Soviet
Russia, houses like Owczarski’s exemplified Singer’s mistreatment of its workers. In 1933,
American Journalist Myra Page travelled to Podolsk to investigate life within a Soviet city. Page
spoke with workers who had lived and worked in Podolsk before the revolution. Thanks to her
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discussions with these employees, Page offers a different interpretation of the housing situation
in Podolsk:
Deliberately he [Dixon] set about building up a small labour aristocracy from among the
foremen and skilled workers, making them dependent on the firm’s favour. To them he
made loans of a thousand or fifteen hundred rubles, to build houses…. These loans he
rarely asked back, but used them for pressure, keeping his foremen indebted and faithful
to the company. The majority of the workers he scornfully ignored. For them not one
house was built. They were left to find huts like Feodor or rent “corners” of rooms, like
Andree and his family, and to worry over making ends meet, as best they could. 135
While Page’s language is perhaps overly dramatic, and her observations reflect the propaganda
purposes of her publication, there remains a significant contrast between her narration and
Owczarski’s. Where Owczarski saw his own success and achievement reflected in his house,
workers like Feodor and Andree interpreted the house as an underhanded gift of Kompaniya
Singer. Moreover, it was a gift they were incapable of attaining.
Divisions of interpretation like these help to account for the small representation of
factory employees among the affidavit writers. The linemen of the Podolsk factory, whose
professional and class interests more readily aligned with the Bolsheviks, are completely absent
from the Singer affidavits. For the factory workers, Singer and factory management had long
been an adversary. For members of the factory management, like Owczarski, Singer had long
been a resource. These two paths continued during the revolution.
Adjacent to this class-based analysis, however, is another important factor. While the
five Podolsk affidavit subjects were not members of the proletariat, they were also ethnic
outsiders in Podolsk. In his studies of Kompaniya Singer’s factory, Fred V. Carstensen found
that the majority of the Podolsk laborers and foremen were ethnically Russian.136 None of the
affidavit subjects from Podolsk were Russian. Dixon, as has been discussed, was a naturalized
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American, born in Britain. Creutzberg, Bludau, and Brüggert were ethnically German and moved
to Germany after leaving Russia.137 Owczarski was Polish.
Owczarski was born in Poland and his Polish nationality was his eventual ticket out of
the Soviet Union. Although portions of Poland had been included in the Russian Empire for
many years, the role of Poles and Polish nationalism within the Empire had long been a source of
contention and conflict.138 This national animosity did not disappear with the revolution.
Poland’s reemergence on the map of Europe, combined with the failed Soviet conquest of
Poland, made the place of Poles living in Russia even more complex. 139 Owczarski does not
state which year he left Podolsk, but the fact that he continued working in the factory after it was
nationalized makes it likely that he returned to Poland after the Red Army’s failure in the PolishSoviet War. Owczarski’s Polish nationality combined with his managerial position to set him
apart at Podolsk. Both by class and nationality, he was different from the majority of Singer’s
Podolsk employees. These differences put Owczarski at odds with the new Soviet state.
Owczarski’s national identity would not have had the same implications in his
relationship with Singer. Singer was a multinational corporation, whose outposts reached around
the globe.

For men like Owczarski, who wished to be repatriated, Singer’s multinational

business model could be helpful in securing a position in their ethnic homeland or their country
of citizenship. By 1930, Owczarski was a Singer manager in Warsaw and a Polish citizen. 140
The other affidavit subjects from Podolsk all eventually worked at Singer factories in their
countries of citizenship: Cruetzburg, Bludeau, and Brüggert in Wittenberg; Dixon in Elizabeth,
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New Jersey.141 Singer was a useful connection for the national and economic outsiders at the
Podolsk factory.

The reach of Singer’s usefulness, however, may have been limited to

employees in managerial positions. Like traditional company men, Owczarski and the other
Podolsk affidavit writers were members of the management. It is unclear whether workers
would have been able to access Singer’s resources. As the company had been a source of
advancement and material gain for the managerial employees in Podolsk, so it became a source
of security outside of Russia. Faced with upheaval in Russia, Singer became a lifeline for this
small group of factory workers. For those managers in a position to access Singer’s networks,
the company became a source of employment and economic security beyond the Russian border.
Moscow Executives and the Ukrainian Route: Otto Myslik
The hope of continued foreign employment with Singer was not limited to Singer’s
factory management. Many members of Singer’s sales and executive staff envisioned similar
futures with Singer, and many would realize them. Nearly half (twenty-three) of the affidavit
subjects mention working for Singer after leaving Russia, and it is possible that others simply
failed to mention their employment with Singer. Those that did mention their jobs in the 1920s
and 1930s were working in a variety of positions throughout Singer’s network in disparate
locations across Europe and North America. Like the affidavit subjects from Podolsk, many of
Kompaniya Singer’s sales managers were not ethnically Russian, and they faced many similar
national and class-based conflicts.
For members of Singer’s sales staff and management, however, the unfolding of the
revolution and civil war was quite different from the progression at the factory. The closure of
Singer’s sales apparatus was a slow and piecemeal process that varied greatly across the Russian
141
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lands. After Podolsk ceased producing sewing machines in 1917, Singer’s large sales network
continued selling imported machines and collecting payment on its trademark credit sales. The
workers’ council that made demands to the Podolsk leadership had taken on the mantle of sales
employees along with factory workers, but it is unclear how deep this united front truly ran.
There were examples of labor unrest among the sales staff, but they were generally
geographically isolated.

Some cities, including Warsaw and Yaroslavl, faced persistent

difficulties in labor relations in the years before 1917, but this problem was not universal.142 The
sequestration addressed in the previous chapter and the territorial losses of World War I were
larger disruptions for the sales division, forcing shop closures long before the revolutions.
The year 1917 brought a mixed bag of effects for Kompaniya Singer’s sales divisions.
Following the February Revolution, the tsarist government inspectors that had plagued Singer
since 1915 were finally removed. 143 The freedom afforded by this removal was tempered by the
uncertainty and instability of the government. After the Bolshevik rise to power, this uncertainty
mounted as Singer’s position became more precarious.
Kompaniya Singer’s Moscow headquarters were confronted with Bolshevism soon after
the October Revolution. Singer’s director, Czech-born Otto Myslik, was responsible for all of
Singer’s Russian business. Adapting to the changing situations, Myslik did his best to hold
together the Company’s wide network. One of Myslik’s key strategies was the appearance of
cooperation with the ideals of bolshevism. In early 1918, Myslik attempted to preemptively
forestall nationalization by asking the Committee of the Moscow Industrial District to appoint a
government overseer for Kompaniya Singer. The man appointed, Ephim Roubine, was a known
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commodity and friendly to Singer. 144 Roubine was so friendly to Singer that after leaving Russia
in 1925, he became a Singer employee in Beirut. 145 Through Roubine, Myslik was able to
maintain his—and Singer’s—control of the Russian enterprise.
Roubine was granted an entirely new position.

He was put in charge of Singer’s

Extraordinary Committee of the Highest Economical Council of the People—a name that was
chosen, one employee remembered, because of its “imposing” sound. 146

When it became

necessary to appoint a new head for this committee, the Soviet committee overseer appointed a
Mr. Schick, a friend of Roubine’s and, as Kompaniya Singer’s former bookkeeper recalled, “a
Bolshevik only in name.”147 Through Roubine and Schick, Myslik continued to oversee the day
to day operation of Singer’s Soviet sales division through 1919.
The situation in Moscow became increasingly fraught, however, and Myslik left the city
in July 1918. Only a few days earlier, a formal decree had nationalized the Singer shops within
Soviet Russia. Despite this decree, Myslik and Singer’s New York leadership were not prepared
to write off the Russian business. Many Singer shops in the south and east of Russia were not
under the Bolshevik jurisdiction. The Civil war was being waged, and it was far from clear who
would emerge victorious. Relocating to non-Soviet held cities in Ukraine, Myslik continued to
oversee the business in the non-Soviet South.148
Coordinating with Singer leadership in New York, Myslik sought unsuccessfully to
maintain normal operations in Ukraine and South Russia. Since supply lines were cut off from
the Russian capitals, the American Singer Manufacturing Company began to ship machines and
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supplies into Ukrainian and Southern Russian ports. 149 Although Singer’s business continued in
the non-Soviet towns of Ukraine and Southern Russia, it was far from business as usual. Shops
were cut off from Singer’s management when their towns were taken by Red Army soldiers.
When White troops recaptured cities during the course of the war, many of these undersupplied
shops reconnected with Singer.150
Myslik negotiated these changes for Singer’s business, while also attempting to secure
his own safety. As the War progressed through Ukraine, Myslik bounced from city to city in the
Russian and Ukrainian south. Between July 1918 and March 1919, he resided alternately in
Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa. 151 In March 1919, the Soviets took over Ukraine. During that same
month, Myslik left the former Russian Empire for good. Like many others fleeing the Soviet
lands, Myslik landed in Constantinople.152

From there, and later London, he continued to

communicate with Singer-controlled shops in the former Russian Empire.
Myslik, like factory director W.F. Dixon, was early to leave Russia.

While other

employees lingered in Russia and the Soviet Union, either by choice or by inability to leave,
these two were removed quickly. As Kompaniya Singer’s highest ranking employees they had
the monetary resources and personal connections to facilitate their departure from Russia.
Moreover, more than anyone else in Kompaniya Singer, these two men personified the
management and the bourgeoisie. In the midst of a Russian and proletarian revolution, they were
neither. While factory managers like Owczarski were the low-level enforcers of company
policy, Myslik was the orchestrator of such policies. Before and after 1917, both Myslik and
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Dixon actively opposed workers’ councils and strikers on behalf of Singer. 153 They personified
the old, capitalist order and there was no spot for them in Bolshevik Russia. Myslik, whose
position as a Russian (or, at least non-German) subject had made him an ideal candidate to lead
Kompaniya Singer during the First World War was no longer secure within Russia. Before or
soon after the Bolsheviks came to power in a locale, Myslik left. His departures were aided by
Singer.

Although he retained responsibility for the leadership of Kompaniya Singer, he

remained outside of Russia after 1919.
Myslik and Dixon were not alone in their flight. Others who personified the old order
may have found it difficult, not to mention undesirable, to transition to the new. Nicolai
Vasilievitch Teslenko, for example, was Kompaniya Singer’s chief lawyer. Although not strictly
speaking an employee of Singer, Teslenko followed nearly the same plan as Myslik in leaving
Russia. He proceeded to non-Soviet portions of Ukraine before sailing to Constantinople and
Paris. Teslenko had been a member of the Imperial Duma, the Moscow City Council and
Zemstvo, and a board member for a large bank. 154 He, like Myslik and Dixon, would never have
been perceived as a revolutionary. The only option left was to leave Russia when the Soviets
advanced.
Without the ability to be accepted in the new political reality, Myslik and his peers chose
to bind themselves to Singer. Like Owczarski, Myslik could be assured of Singer’s multinational
perspective and the potential of a professional future with Singer outside of Russia. Myslik’s
personal ties to Singer, however, were even deeper than Owczarski’s.

While the factory

manager could thank Singer for his middle-class lifestyle, Singer was the source of Myslik’s
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even greater economic and social security. Having risen to a powerful and secure leadership
position within the Singer infrastructure, he had reason to remain tightly connected to the Singer
Manufacturing Company. In addition to receiving professional aid from the company, Myslik
had been the provider of aid on behalf of the company. Kompaniya Singer was an instrument of
Myslik’s ambitions and goals, as he had led and fashioned it. It was reasonable that Myslik and
Dixon, who had gained so much from Kompaniya Singer and contributed so much to its design,
would believe in the rightness of their company and the wrongness of the revolution. Perhaps
more so than any of the other affidavit writers, Myslik and Dixon had cause to be loyal to Singer.
Singer had given them much, and they had good reason to trust that it would continue to do so.
Clerks in the Capital Cities: Emil Fridlender
Although Myslik quickly left Russia, many of his employees in Moscow did not. Those
sales employees and members of the Kompaniya Singer central leadership who remained in
Moscow and Petrograd during the Civil war faced many difficult and tragic circumstances. Two
employees mentioned battling typhus, while others mentioned the illnesses or deaths of their
children and families.155 An extreme example, Alfred Espenberg, Singer’s Central Agency
Manager at Petrograd, witnessed the death of his only child in August 1920, followed only a few
months later by the murder of his wife and the robbery of his home.156 Reflecting on his
experience in 1921, Espenberg summarized that “the conditions in Petrograd are in the last
stages of desperation.”157 Nine years later, he remembered his years in Soviet Petrograd as “the
most difficult times of my life.”158
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In his affidavits and a letter written immediately after leaving Russia, Emil L. Fridlender
was even more forthright in his depiction of the hardships of life in revolutionary Russia. 159
Fridlender had been Kompaniya Singer’s chief bookkeeper since the outbreak of World War I.
Before coming to Moscow, Fridlender’s career with Kompaniya Singer had already taken him
across the Russian Empire, including stints in Samara, Orenburg, and Tomsk.160 An experienced
and trusted presence in Singer’s Moscow office, Fridlender remained in Moscow until 1920 at
the direction of Otto Myslik. 161 Staying in Moscow longer than Myslik, Fridlender witnessed
first-hand later stages in Singer’s nationalization. In June 1919, Fridlender personally opened
Singer’s safety deposit boxes for the Bolsheviks’ sequestration.162 As bookkeeper, he recorded
the lack of installment payments, as sewing machine purchasers were unable to pay for their
machines. Eventually, the Soviet authorities claimed that they, not Singer, were the rightful
recipients of these payments.

163

In short, Fridlender witnessed the slow decay of Singer’s

Moscow business.
Beyond professional observations, Fridlender also recounted the difficulty of life in
Soviet Moscow.

Although less dramatic than Espenberg’s tragedy, Fridlender’s personal

journey was trying. By remaining in Moscow, he was separated for nearly two years from his
family, which it seems had already left for Fridlender’s native Latvia. 164 When Fridlender was
finally prepared to leave Moscow, even that was a challenge. Twice he attempted to secretly
cross the Russian-Latvian border. When these attempts failed, a contact in the Cheka Evacuation
Department assisted Fridlender in registering as a Latvian refugee. He traveled for eleven days
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in a “cattle-truck” to escape Russia, arriving in Riga in October 1920. 165 Destitute upon his
arrival in Latvia, Fridlender pleaded with Myslik for a job, which it seems likely he received by
the mid-1920s.166
Beyond his personal circumstances, Fridlender’s description of life in Soviet Russia is
quite bleak. Food supplies were insufficient. There was not enough fuel for heating. Buildings
were dismantled so that their wood could be burned for warmth.167 Even the account books held
by one of the Petrograd banks with which Kompaniya Singer did business had been burned as
fuel.168 In evocative language, Fridlender described this world as “the Hell of Soviet Russia”
and a land where “nothing but ruin and desolation remains.”169
Clearly, Fridlender had no affinity for the revolution. It had left him destitute and
without a job. Fridlender and his middle-management colleagues had, like Myslik, gained
respect and position from Singer. In comparison to upheaval and chaos they experienced in the
Civil war, Singer would seem a stable alternative. Yet, Singer also caused difficulties for
Fridlender. It was Singer, through Myslik, that expected him to remain in Moscow as long as he
did. It was his past association with Singer that made the Bolsheviks look on him and the other
former Singer employees, as he remembered, “with mistrust and ill will.” 170 Singer or his
connection with Singer was a source of many problems for Fridlender. While Bolshevik attacks
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on his employer may have pushed Fridlender toward greater corporate identification and loyalty,
there were other forces that pushed employees like Fridlender to stay close to Singer.
Within the often-horrible environment of Russia’s war-torn capitals, material assistance
was invaluable. A company of Singer’s size, even during its local subsidiary’s demise, had the
potential to provide such assistance to Fridlender and his colleagues. Many of Singer’s
employees remarked on the growth of the barter economy within Soviet cities, and Singer had
material goods. Klara Nylaender, who, like Fridlender, worked in Kompaniya Singer’s Moscow
cash department, commented on these material benefits. In 1919, when the company was still
being run covertly by Myslik through Schick, each employee was given a sewing machine to
trade for essential goods.171 A year later, “the management gave to each employee secretly 100
reels of cotton.”172 These gifts did not meet all of the employees’ basic needs, but they were a
good start. In order to gain access to these types of goods, employees needed to remain close to
the company and its leaders.

Close ties to Singer, as even Fridlender’s rather mundane

interactions with the Bolshevik authorities revealed, brought risks. Former employees of Singer,
according to Fridlender, were viewed with suspicion by the Bolshevik authorities and were “in
constant danger of losing their positions.” 173 Undoubtedly these risks increased after Schick’s
death in later 1919 and Myslik’s resulting loss of influence over the company’s operations. For
men and women in dire straits, however, the possibility of gaining much needed resources could
make the risk worthwhile.
When corporate gifts came up short, bartering goods could also be stolen. Where stocks
of supplies and sewing machines remained in shops and warehouses throughout Russia, they
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were attractive to thieves. Many of these thieves were Singer’s own employees, and several of
the affidavits allude to their actions. Kuno Ganzel, a superintendent in Kompaniya Singer’s
Moscow headquarters, and Herman Jaroschka, a manager in Kherson, spoke of the objects taken
by Singer’s employees.174 Longtime employee Jean Petrovitch Dekscheneck put it succinctly:
“A great deal of the property in the various agencies, depots or warehouses and the shops was
taken by former employees, by soldiers of various armies, or destroyed.” 175
In order to steal, one either needs the authority or the proximity to do so. There must be
some level of access. While soldiers gained this access through authority and force, Singer’s
employees and past employees had proximity and know-how. While none of the affidavit
writers mention the potential to steal goods as a reason for staying associated with Kompaniya
Singer and Glavshveimashin, the material wealth of the company should not be overlooked. The
potential generosity of the company in bestowing gifts on its workers was accompanied by the
more sinister possibility of taking those good without permission. In either case, closeness to
Singer could bring material rewards beyond the meager allocations given by the government.
Managers on the Far Reaches of the Empire: Voldemar Ernst
In addition to providing material assistance, Singer could also open doors for its
employees.

As a multinational corporation headquartered in the United States, the Singer

Manufacturing Company had access to powerful foreign allies. These foreign, and
predominantly American, contacts were especially valuable for Singer employees living in the
far reaches of the former Russian Empire.
Through the port cities of Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok, the United States became
directly involved in the Civil war. The American Polar Bear Expedition, despite its failure to
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turn the tide in the Civil war, occupied Arkhangelsk for nearly a year from the fall of 1918 to the
summer of 1919. Similarly, American forces were based in Vladivostok from 1918 to 1920.
The involvement of the American government in these regions provided Singer and its
employees with valuable contacts and protection.

Singer’s shops remained open, as did

communication with the company’s New York leadership. For Singer’s employees in these
American outposts, the Civil war had a distinctly international context.
The experiences of Kompaniya Singer’s Siberian manager, Voldemar Wilhelm Ernst,
reflect this international dimension. Ernst, who unlike the other employees discussed in this
chapter was born in Russia, began his career with Kompaniya Singer in Orenburg in 1903. At
the time of the revolutions, he was directing Singer’s Siberian business from Irkutsk. 176 Far from
the action of the capital cities, Ernst did not experience the effects of the Bolshevik revolution in
the same way as Singer’s employees in European Russia.
For the first years of the Civil war, Ernst’s experiences were less direct and more
directorial. Singer’s New York executives, recognizing that the Civil war had divided their
Russian market, placed Ernst in independent control of the Siberian Singer operations in
December 1918. Through the U.S.-controlled port at Vladivostok, Ernst travelled to the United
States to meet personally with the Singer Manufacturing Company executives and prepare a
course of action for Singer’s Siberian network. While a visit to the United States from European
Russia at this time would have been nearly impossible, the situation in the Russian east made
travel feasible. Officially divorced from Myslik’s authority and Kompaniya Singer’s Moscow
headquarters, Ernst’s Siberian territory was placed under the direct authority of the New York
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headquarters.177 Shipments of machines, needles, and other necessary equipment began to flow
from North America to Vladivostok.178
This is not to say that the repercussions of the revolution and civil war were minimal in
Siberia. On the contrary, Ernst fielded requests and reports from the Urals to Vladivostok which
documented local shops’ lack of supplies and lack of security. Ernst’s own experiences
confirmed the hardships of war. Like Singer managers throughout Russia, he was confronted by
employee uprisings.

Employees returning to the Far East from the War demanded larger

payments than Ernst and Singer were prepared to give. 179 The money with which Ernst paid his
employees and maintained Singer’s business was rapidly depreciating. In 1919, Ernst bought a
building in Irkutsk on Singer’s behalf in the hope that real estate would hold its value better than
cash.180 Once the political situation stabilized, he hoped to sell the building and reclaim the
company’s money.

The desired stability would never come in the form Ernst imagined,

however. As one of his Irkutsk employees recalled, Ernst was forced by “the political conditions
and the fighting” to abandon both his investment and the city of Irkutsk.181 Moving to Chita and
eventually Vladivostok, Ernst managed Singer’s business in eastern Russia from within the
country until March 1923. In 1923, Ernst left for Harbin.182
While Ernst’s ability to stay in Russia four years longer than Myslik owes much to his
remote location, it also owes a great deal to powerful connections.
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corporation, the Singer Manufacturing Company could provide entry to powerful professional
networks. As an American company, Singer provided a connection to the U.S. government.
The Singer Manufacturing Company had long called on American representatives within
Russia to protect its business. As discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. State Department
was active in fighting against the sequestration of Kompaniya Singer’s shops during World War
I. Following the Russian Revolution, the State Department and especially the American consuls
in Russia became an essential partner in Singer’s communication and the protection of its assets.
The directors of Kompaniya Singer and the Singer Manufacturing Company trusted the
American State Department as an effective medium to communicate quickly and securely.
Before leaving Russia, Otto Myslik exchanged telegrams with Singer Manufacturing Company
President Douglas Alexander via the American Consul and State Department.183 When he had to
leave Moscow, Myslik left many of the Company’s books, receipts, and documents with the
consul for safe keeping.184 Once he arrived in Constantinople, Myslik continued to communicate
with the Singer leadership through the State Department’s networks, even using this means of
communication to facilitate in-person meetings with Singer’s New York leadership.185
In the Far East, the U.S. State Department and consuls played an especially important
security and assistance role for Ernst. From early in the Civil war, Ernst called upon the
American Consul in Irkutsk. In 1918, when veterans returning to Singer’s employment in
Irkutsk demanded larger payment from the company, Ernst appealed to the American Consul.
The employees, reported Ernst, had pledged to “seize by force the General office and the local
store of the company, drive out the management and do as they might see fit with the proper [sic]
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of the company.” 186 In order to protect Singer’s interests, the American Consul urged Ernst to
“temporarily” close the Singer offices in Irkutsk. The consulate worked to prevent Ernst’s arrest
and took temporary possession of Singer’s safe and building keys. 187 After the mitigation of this
crisis, the consulate continued to aid Ernst.

In 1919, the U.S. State Department ferried

communication and funds between Ernst and Singer’s New York headquarters. 188 When Ernst
permanently left Russian territory in 1923, he left Singer’s Vladivostok assets “under seal” of the
U.S. Consulate, which continued to advocate for Singer’s interests in the city. 189
To Singer managers like Ernst, the U.S. State Department was a safe and dependable
business ally. As conditions in Russia became more and more unstable, Singer employees called
upon the State Department for assistance and in order to document their hardships for future use.
The affidavits collected by Singer and which form the bulk of the source material for this chapter
were sent to the State Department for just such a documentary purpose.

For official

representatives of Singer, the State Department fulfilled an important commercial purpose.
Beyond such official uses, however, the State Department became a useful resource for
the personal needs of Kompaniya Singer’s employees. When it became necessary for Ernst to
leave Irkutsk, the American Consul helped him get out of the city. 190 Walter Dixon, once he had
left Russia, called upon the U.S. State Department to ferry information about his sister-in-law
and her family in Moscow to him in America.191 In Omsk, the American Consul helped Ivan
Nicolaievitch Mowtschanow to reclaim Singer’s shops, but also to avoid arrest. When it came
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time to give his affidavit, Mowtschanow remembered the consulate’s help with great affection
and credited the staff for his safety, saying “Although twelve years have passed I still remember
with thanks the attempts of Messrs. Thompson and Gray to facilitate the task given me by the
Management and to protect me from the power of the Confiscators.”192
For these employees, the U.S. State Department provided invaluable assistance in
securing their safety and even their passage out of war zones. With the exception of Dixon,
however, none of these men were American citizens. 193 Their connection to the resources of the
U.S. State Department came solely through their association with the Singer Manufacturing
Company. By staying closely tied to Singer’s multinational enterprise, Ernst, Mowtschanow,
and others gained access to foreign institutions to which they would have been unable to appeal
independently. Whether these international security networks motivated men like Ernst to stay
connected to Singer is impossible to say. Nonetheless, for the employees that made use of these
connections, Kompaniya Singer provided entry into useful international networks.

As the

situation in Russia became more dangerous, such networks and support systems became more
important. For Singer’s managerial employees and others in a position to trade on Singer’s
name, the company’s powerful foreign allies could become valuable personal allies.
Wartime Internees in the Urals: Adolf Harich
Up to this point, the individuals highlighted have experienced the revolution and Civil
war as employees of Kompaniya Singer.
population of past Singer employees.

Within the affidavits, however, is a significant

Although these men (they are all men), had worked for

Singer’s Russian business in the past, they were no longer employed by Singer in 1917. Subjects
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of Russia’s World War I enemies or ethnic Germans, these sixteen past Singer employees had
been interned in the Russian interior during World War I.
This internment took many different forms. Nearly all the internees were imprisoned for
at least a few weeks, but most were not incarcerated long. After initial arrests, they lived in
relative freedom in the Ural regions of Ufa and Orenburg. 194 Some men continued to work
during internment. Many moved, or were moved, throughout the Urals or Siberia during the war
years. Most, however, were separated from Singer’s enterprise.
At the same time that Bolshevik policies were being implemented in Moscow, the Civil
war was reaching the Urals. The revolutions and Civil war disrupted the imperial internment
system, and many of the employees chronicled in the affidavits attempted to make their way to
Germany or the newly independent Baltic states.

These men had been sent to the Urals

precisely because of the mountains’ distance from the Germanic lands, however. The trip to
Europe was a long and arduous one.
Adolf Harich was one of these internees. Born in Freudenthal, Silesia, Harich was an
Austrian subject.195 A few months before the outbreak of the First World War, Harich accepted
a position as a clerk in Kompaniya Singer’s Moscow offices. About a week after the war began
in the summer of 1914, Harich was ordered to report to the Russian military authorities. After
being held in the barracks for about two weeks, Harich and his co-worker Kuno Ganzel, were
sent to Orenberg. The following spring, Harich was moved to a different town within the
Orenburg region.
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As a prisoner, Harich was barred from employment and dependent on

financial aid from his former employer.

With the October Revolution, however, this aid
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ended.197 Around the same time, Harich began working for the Danish Embassy in Orenburg.
His supervisor was responsible for “looking after” Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Russian
internment, and Harich helped in this work.198
In Orenburg, Harich found himself in the midst of the fighting between the Czech legion,
Admiral Kolchak’s White troops, and the Red Army. Harich’s Danish boss and Harich himself
were caught up in the fighting.

Although Harich does not explain the circumstances, his

supervisor was arrested and killed by Czech troops in August 1918.199 Harich was also arrested,
sent to Samara, and eventually acquitted by a Czech court martial at Ekaterinburg. 200 After his
acquittal, Harich was moved to Chelyabinsk and another village occupied by White troops. In
March 1919, he resumed his work with the Danes, only for it to be finally ended by the
Bolshevik conquest of Chelyabinsk in July. 201 In September 1919, Harich was arrested by the
Bolsheviks. He was sent to Ufa and later imprisoned in Moscow. On February 16, 1921, he was
released and allowed to leave Russia. Harich returned to Czechoslovakia before settling in
Vienna with a new position in one of Singer’s Viennese shops. 202
When Harich returned to work with Singer in 1921, it had been seven years since he had
last worked for the company. Although he had received financial aid from Kompaniya Singer
into 1917, he had only worked for the company for one year before his internment. Perhaps he
had worked for Singer in his homeland before coming to Russia, but if that was the case, he
never mentions it. The new position he acquired after leaving Russia, assistant manager of a
shop, was quite different from his Moscow job as a headquarters clerk. How, after so many
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years, did Harich find himself once again working—in an entirely new capacity—for the same,
old company?
While the answer is no doubt complex, one component is simple. Harich, like so many
other Singer employees interned during the First World War, had never cut his ties to his former
employer.

Like the employees that remained in Petrograd and Moscow, many interned

employees received practical aid from Singer during their internment. In his affidavit, Harich
explains that, until the October Revolution, he had been “dependent for the necessities of life
upon assistance which was paid to me by Kompaniya Singer.” 203 Much like the free Singer
employees, the interned employees benefitted materially from their association with Singer.
While this material aid helped to connect Harich and his fellow internees to Singer, it
ended in October 1917. After that time, there were very few material benefits Singer could
provide in the short term. Despite this fact, many of the interned employees kept tabs on Singer.
In their affidavits, many interned employees were able to recount stories of Singer’s activities in
the Ural cities, although most of them never worked in that region. Arno Hunger, for instance,
who had managed Singer’s Baku central agency before the War, knew of the confiscation of
Singer’s Baku goods. Although Hunger returned to Baku after his internment, he never again
worked for Singer in the city. 204 Likewise, Harich reports in his affidavit that many of the Singer
shops in the Ural towns he visited were open into 1919.205 As the purpose of the affidavits was
to chart the demise of Kompaniya Singer, it makes perfect sense that Hunger, Harich, and others
comment on the state of the enterprise. During the Civil war, however, Harich and Hunger were
not thinking about their future affidavits. Rather, they must have had other reasons for keeping
abreast of Singer’s affairs.
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The tie of Singer employees like Harich and Hunger to the corporation is not nearly as
straightforward as the ties that connected Myslik, Fridlender, Ernst, or Owczarski to Singer.
Unlike these earlier examples, the internees were no longer employed by Singer. Like them,
however, the internees were outsiders. As white-collar workers, they were not likely to gain
acceptance from the revolutionary working class. As Germans or enemy subjects, they were
suspect in their Russian environment.

Their connection to the company may have been

motivated more by the need for connection, community, and assistance, than by material reward
or loyalty to Singer.
In many ways, Singer provided a network and community for its internee employees.
Whether German, Austrian, or Russian subjects before World War I, the internees shared an
ethnically Germanic background. Ethnic Germans were overrepresented in the Imperial Russian
elite and, as was discussed in the previous chapter, within Kompaniya Singer. Within the
affidavit set, however, the representation of ethnic Germans is even less proportional. Despite
Singer’s desire to use local staff, twelve of the affidavit writers identified themselves as German
subjects or ethnic Germans; an additional two were German citizens by 1930. Another ten were
born or claimed citizenship in the Baltic states, while there was one Austrian and one Volga
German in the group. Many of those with Latvian and Estonian citizenship were likely ethnic
Germans. In fact, four of the affidavit subjects that styled themselves as from Latvia or Estonia
were among the internees.
That so many of these ethnically German employees were included in the affidavit set
suggests a strong ethnically German social or support network within Kompaniya Singer. In his
book The Jewish Century, Yuri Slezkine argues that the Jews of the nineteenth and twentieth
century, often outcasts from their surrounding societies, built mobile communities and networks
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of their own.206 Benjamin Sawyer suggests that this same “Mercurian” model of connectedness
and mobility was a trademark of Kompaniya Singer’s German employees. 207 Outside of the
mainstream of Russian society, the German employees were tied together along ethnic lines.
The hub of that connection was their workplace, Kompaniya Singer.
It was through Kompaniya Singer that these German workers came into contact with one
another, and sustaining a connection to Singer was a way to maintain these interpersonal and
professional connections. Several of the employees, especially those who had been interned
during the war, called on their former colleagues before leaving Russia. Friedrich Bäumler, a
German-born Singer employee who had worked in St. Petersburg, Orel, Archangelsk, Odessa,
and Kozlov before being arrested in 1918, was one such employee. When he was released in
June 1918, Bäumler travelled through Moscow to return to Germany. In Moscow, he stopped in
the Singer offices to see Otto Myslik.208 Similarly, Podolsk employee Max Creutzburg visited his
old factory and spoke with a former coworker after his release from internment in Orenburg.
During their conversation he ascertained how much things had changed, and he left for Germany
soon after.209
Even when there was no one left to visit, many employees made pilgrimages to their
former workplaces.

In 1920, for instance, former Singer Central Agency Manager Armin

Coldewey visited the Moscow and Petrograd offices of Kompaniya Singer on his way to
Germany. When he arrived at the Singer Building on Petrograd’s Nevsky Prospect, by that time
already turned into a bookstore, he was stopped by soldiers and told “that there was nothing there
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and that [he] should leave.”210 In one sense, these visits may have been a form of disaster
tourism—a chance to see what had become of once treasured locations. This explanation does
not seem wholly satisfying. The employees did not go simply to observe, but to attempt to
connect for business and personal reward. Coldewey was not content to wait outside, but tried to
enter.
Even for those employees that did not seek out their old colleagues or workplaces, the
chance encounters with past or present Singer employees were noted. While imprisoned in
Moscow, Harich met Jan Myslik, brother of Kompaniya Singer director Otto Myslik, who
informed Harich of Singer’s nationalization. Whether Harich knew Jan Myslik before the war is
unclear. Their time in Singer’s Moscow office did not overlap. They were both from the Czech
regions of the Austrian Empire and they had both worked for Singer, however. This tie to Singer
was an essential part of their tie to one another.
In these visits to individuals and locations, the professional and personal “Mercurian”
network is the draw. Singer’s interned employees, like other members of “Mercurian” networks,
belonged to a modern mobile workforce. They were not tied to the land or a particular locale.
For Singer’s “Mercurian” employees, the First World War and Russian Revolutions upset any
grounding they may have attained within Russian culture. All that remained in the face of this
upheaval was their mobility and their network of fellow travelers. Singer, which had directed the
employees’ mobility and facilitated their “Mercurian” network, became a dependable resource.
For foreigners within Russia, for whom state and class loyalties were not available resources, the
company was a lifeline. Singer provided a wide-reaching network of similar colleagues. It was
Singer that had brought them together, and it was through Singer that they remained a
community.
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Rethinking Company Men
Singer’s fostering of a “Mercurian” community, its offering of future employment and
powerful contacts, and its ability to supply immediate necessities made the company a valuable
partner for its employees. Through their relationships with Singer, the employees profiled in this
chapter personally benefited. Owczarski received social standing in Podolsk and a job in his
native Poland. Myslik and Dixon gained material wealth and high-ranking employment.
Fridlender had access to bartering goods at a time when even the bare necessities were difficult
to attain. Ernst had a connection to the U.S. government, which protected his interests and his
life. Harich and the other internees were entered into a “Mercurian” community of support and
comradery. These were only some of the benefits felt by the employees. Fridlender wrote to
Myslik in the years after leaving Russia and also benefitted from a “Mercurian” community.
Like Owczarski, Myslik, Dixon, and Ernst all took new positions with Singer. In similar ways,
the other affidavit subjects gained through their relationships with the company.

These

employees were not simply cogs in the wheel of the company. Rather, they intentionally
mobilized and manipulated their employer’s resources for their own well-being. They used
Singer as a tool for securing their material and personal security. This agency on the part of
Kompaniya Singer’s employees complicates the picture of modern company men.
Although these employees fit the white-collar mold of the Cold War-era “organization
men,” they were not simply submissive company men. They could not be. Ordinary corporate
institutions were turned on their heads by the Bolshevik’s militantly anti-capitalist agenda, and
the circumstances of the war and revolution made it impossible to advance to a comfortable
retirement solely by climbing the corporate ladder. While Cold War-era company men achieved
bureaucratic mundanity through association with their employers, Singer’s employees needed
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and sought a much more dynamic and risky relationship to their company. Choosing to associate
with one of the bulwarks of modern capitalism during an anti-capitalist revolution was certainly
a risk, as to which tales of imprisonment and suspicion like Owczarski’s testify. Yet, many
employees believed that they stood to gain more from their relationship with Singer than they
stood to lose.
Part of this belief came from their ability to retain personal autonomy. Autonomy within
the context of a larger corporate culture was a hallmark of Singer’s corporate strategy. Given the
difficulty of long distance communication within Russia, local managers had long been trusted to
act in the best interest of the company. 211 As communication with Moscow and New York grew
increasingly difficult during the war and revolution, local managers and even clerks were left to
their own devices. As Singer’s Russian managerial hierarchy fell apart, these local authorities
operated more and more independently.
This individual autonomy within the corporate structure is included within some
conceptions of early company men. One suggested embodiment of this autonomous company
man was the railroad stationmaster. In contrast to “organization men,” railroad stationmasters
had a level of autonomy and real authority.

Geographically removed from the railroad

headquarters, they ruled over their own affairs. While bound to the standing orders of their
superiors, they were expected to use their own resourcefulness and best judgement to run their
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stations.212 In many ways, the Kompaniya Singer network of sales divisions and depots was
analogous, even in its terminology, to the railroad. While railroad executives could always hop
on the next train to correct their stationmaster subordinates, however, this direct executive
control became functionally impossible in revolutionary Russia.

As Ernst was formally

separated from Myslik’s authority due to the impossibility of communication, lower-level
employees experienced informal autonomy. Even without this threat of managerial correction
looming over them, the Singer employees in these affidavits often acted in Singer’s best interest.
Given such substantial autonomy, why did they not abandon their employer’s interests in favor
of their own?
Fundamentally, this question masks a faulty assumption. In many cases, the affidavit
writers never had to consider abandoning Singer’s interests for their personal interests, because
the two were often the same. The Kompaniya Singer employees whose stories are told in these
affidavits would not have made good Bolsheviks.

As white-collar workers, they were

predisposed to be against the October Revolution and they were seen as adversaries by emerging
workers’ groups. As ethnic foreigners, they were further separated from the Russian population.
Had they desired to be accepted in the emerging Soviet system, these employees would have had
difficulty. These employees were not simply corporate stooges or turncoats. They did not fit in
the class or ethnic groups favored by the Bolsheviks, and they did not see anything to be gained
from the revolution. Rather, for Singer’s affidavit writers, the instability of revolutionary Russia
only compounded the instability brought on by World War I. Singer’s Russian and international
leadership saw the Revolution in the same way.
As a multinational and capitalist organization, Singer became, for its employees, a useful
resource in these uncertain times. Thanks to its massive size and resources, Singer was able to
212

Sampson, Company Man, 24-25.

75

provide its employees with immediate aid, useful connections, and the promise of future
stability. Opposition to bolshevism may have played a role in sustaining Kompaniya Singer’s
company men, but it was the benefits the affidavit writers gleaned from their association with
Singer that solidified the relationship.
Beyond help securing the necessities of daily life, the most important benefits that the
Singer Manufacturing Company gave to its employees were stable and valuable connections.
While the ground was shifting below Russian society, the multinational nature of the Singer
Manufacturing Company gave it a rare stability. Kompaniya Singer was unable to weather the
Russian Civil war, but its parent company remained removed from the violence and turmoil of
revolutionary Russia. While Russian institutions were disappearing or fundamentally changing,
Kompaniya Singer employees could realistically hope that Singer would remain a viable
organization and that its networks of assistance might continue.
For “Mercurians” like the affidavit writers, the promise of future jobs and powerful
friends outside of Russia likely resonated even more strongly than they would have for more
locally rooted Russian residents.

Many of Singer’s affidavit writers were foreign-born or

members of ethnic minorities. Their careers, often with Singer, had required mobility and
adaptation in the past. As a result, they may have been more open to and prepared for seeking
opportunities outside of Russia. Singer had much to offer employees with these transnational
and cosmopolitan perspectives.
Singer’s multinational character, therefore, was essential to its relationship to Kompaniya
Singer’s company men. The company provided its company men with tangible benefits and
stability that was due in large part to its multinational status. A smaller, Russian corporation
would not have been able to supply the same resources to its employees. While corporations
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without a multinational structure may have been able to provide their employees with immediate
aid and material goods in the short term, they could not have provided comparable stability or
the promise of long-term security.
Among businesses, only a vast multinational enterprise like Singer could become a foil to
the rising totalitarianism of Soviet Russia. Only a transnational organization or international
association could offer relative stability as Russian society became increasingly chaotic. For
Kompaniya Singer employees who rejected or were rejected by the Soviet system, Singer
became a resource. Embracing a position as a Singer company man did not represent, as did the
Cold War “organization man,” unthinking allegiance to a possibly malevolent company. On the
contrary, Kompaniya Singer company men used their employer’s strength and resources to
further their own well-being.
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Chapter 4
A Company and Community in Exile
On December 21, 1921, Douglas Alexander, President of the Singer Manufacturing
Company, wrote to Otto Myslik about Podolsk factory employee Kazimierz Owczarski.
Alexander endorsed Myslik’s quest to find a new job for Owczarski within the Singer
organization. Owczarski had only recently left Soviet Russia, and Alexander was interested in
reading the former Podolsk department manager’s assessment of the nationalized factory’s
“manufacturing conditions.” Alexander believed that finding a spot for Owczarski within
Singer’s enterprise would “certainly be to our advantage.” 213 As discussed in the previous
chapter, Singer had a great deal to offer to Owczarski and other Kompaniya Singer employees
faced with the Revolution, but what did these employees have to offer to the company? Why
was the continued employment of this midlevel Russian factory manager an advantage to
Singer?
A crucial part of the answer to this question centers on Singer’s expectation of a return to
its Russian business. For much of the 1920s, Alexander, Myslik, and the rest of the Singer
leadership expected the demise of Bolshevik Russia.

When Soviet power fell, the Singer

executives planned to reenter the Russian market, reclaim their property, and continue to build
Kompaniya Singer.

In order to be prepared for the coming resurrection of their Russian

company, the leadership of the multinational corporation kept alive the idea and community of
Kompaniya Singer. The Singer Manufacturing Company actively fostered Kompaniya Singer as
a company and community in exile.

Alexander to Myslik, December 21, 1921, Micro 2013, Reel 60, Singer Mss. In this letter, Owczarski’s name is
spelled with a transliteration of its Russian spelling “Ovcharsky.”
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This chapter will consider Kompaniya Singer’s existence as a company in exile during
the 1920s. Within the context of the historiographies of both the revolutionary Russian emigrant
communities and the emergence of trade between the West and the early Soviet Union, this
chapter explores the importance to Singer’s business interests of supporting its Russian
employees and keeping them connected to the multinational company. The first half of this
chapter focuses on the Singer leadership’s intended return to the Russian market during the Civil
war and the employees’ preparations for this return.

When the Russian market did not

immediately reopen, Singer’s expectations and business plans evolved. As it became less likely
that the parent company would need Kompaniya Singer’s employees to return to Russia, it
explored trade with Soviet Russia and integrated Kompaniya Singer’s employees into other
markets. Although many former Kompaniya Singer employees continued to work for Singer, as
time progressed they became more connected to Singer’s multinational enterprise than to the
former Russian company.
Kompaniya Singer as a Company in Exile
During the Russian Civil War, the Kompaniya Singer employees that fled Russia were
part of a mass exodus. Somewhere between one and three million refugees found their way out
of the former Russian Empire in the first years following the Russian Revolution. 214 Like many
of the Kompaniya Singer employees profiled in the previous chapter, these Russian refugees
settled in European capitals and the Far East. In these disparate locales, Russian refugees
envisioned themselves as part of an alternate Russia, or a Russia Abroad.
Historians have long considered the political and literary legacy of Russia Abroad, but
the social and cultural history of this diaspora (if, in fact, diaspora is the right word) has only
214
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been assessed over the last few decades.215 Building on early works devoted to the Russian
communities in Paris and Berlin, Marc Raeff reoriented the study of Russia Abroad by defining
the phenomenon as a “society in exile.”216 To Raeff, Russia Abroad was not a collection of
geographically disparate emigrant communities, but a unified society complete with varying
social classes, ethnic groups, and political allegiances Raeff contended that Russia Abroad was
not merely the transplanted aristocracy or liberal intelligentsia.217 Russia Abroad was diverse. In
many ways, it sought to be and was a cultural continuation of the Russian Empire that Singer had
entered in the nineteenth century. Whether the active members of Russia Abroad were truly as
diverse as the intellectual, cultural, and political leaders of the movement supposed is debatable.
As Rogers Brubaker has suggested about diaspora studies, it could be that many refugees from
the Russian Empire were assigned by intellectuals and historians to a community that they did
not actively embrace. Still, the image of a united cultural foil to the Soviet Union persisted in
Russia Abroad. Like the Kompaniya Singer leadership and affidavit writers, the leaders of
Russia Abroad set themselves apart from and in opposition to Bolshevik Russia.
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Many Russian refugees and many Kompaniya Singer employees shared a sense of exile
during the 1920s. To Raeff and his followers, this exile implied the temporary nature of Russia
Abroad. Members of Russia Abroad believed that they would return to Russia on their own
terms, and therefore they did not seek to integrate into their host countries or compromise with
Soviet Russia.

Russia Abroad was set in opposition to Soviet Russia, and its members

anticipated the speedy failure of the Soviet experiment. When (not if) this failure came, Russia
Abroad would be prepared to return and lead Russia.218 The leaders of Kompaniya Singer had
the same expectation of Soviet failure and a similar desire to return to Russia.
Given these similarities, it is tempting to consider Kompaniya Singer as part of Russia
Abroad. In some ways, it was. Kompaniya Singer was chartered as an Imperial Russian
institution, and many of the company’s employees were certainly refugees fleeing the
Revolution. As a subsidiary of a multinational corporation, however, Kompaniya Singer’s
Russian identity was always problematic. Scholars of Russia Abroad discuss their subjects firmly
within a Russian national context, and Singer’s transnational business model makes it a poor fit
for such a discussion. Similarly, while Raeff and his fellows argue for the ethnic and cultural
diversity of Russia Abroad, they assume the exiles were Russian citizens or subjects. Many
displaced Kompaniya Singer employees were not legally Russian. They had migrated to Russia
for work, and after the Revolution they left. As discussed in the chapter on the First World War,
Singer’s multinational business model created a leadership class in Kompaniya Singer that was
cosmopolitan. Although Singer executives argued for the Russianness of their corporation
during World War I, the company remained a fundamentally multinational entity. The prime
objective of the leadership of Kompaniya Singer was not the maintenance of Russian culture or
politics. Their chief concern was to find a way to sell sewing machines within Russia, a desire
218
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that could lead Singer toward collaboration with non-Russian groups or even with the Soviet
Union.
Given the multinational and profit-driven nature of Singer, this chapter does not argue for
Kompaniya Singer’s inclusion in Russia Abroad. Rather, this chapter suggests that in parallel to
this “society in exile,” Kompaniya Singer became a company in exile. In the same way that
Russian political emigrants believed they would return to direct Russian affairs and the White
Army prepared for an opportunity to defeat the Bolsheviks, so the Singer Sewing Machine
Company anticipated its reentry into Russia.
Early Singer Exiles: Walter Dixon and the Fight for Podolsk
Almost as soon as Kompaniya Singer’s leaders left Russia, they began working towards
their return. Walter Dixon, the director of Singer’s Podolsk factory, was immediately put to
work petitioning the U.S. State Department on Singer’s behalf. As an American citizen with
first-hand experience in Russia, Dixon was an obvious choice for this role. For years before
leaving Russia, Dixon had been the bridge between Kompaniya Singer and the U.S. State
Department. Once he returned to the United States, Dixon continued to use his State Department
connections in defense of and advocacy for Kompaniya Singer. The American Consul in
Moscow, Maddin Summers, who called Dixon his “personal friend,” arranged Dixon’s first
meeting with Washington-based State Department officials.219 On January 15, 1918, Dixon met
with these officials to explain Singer’s interests in Russia, and he returned to Washington for a
second meeting a month later.220 In one respect these meetings are merely a continuation of an
ongoing conversation between Singer and Secretary Lansing’s State Department.
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At the same time, Dixon’s January 1918 meeting is an early example of Kompaniya
Singer in exile. Dixon had been forced to flee from Russia and his portion of the Russian
company, the Podolsk factory, was already in many practical ways outside of Singer’s control.
Kompaniya Singer’s Russian sales operations continued to function, but the company’s
ownership of the Podolsk factory was little more than nominal. As discussed in the previous
chapter, Otto Myslik had negotiated a lease with the Bolshevik authorities to ensure Singer
ownership of the factory through September 1918. By the end of the lease period, however, the
Soviet authorities were in firm control of the factory.

For all practical purposes, Dixon’s

departure had marked the end of Singer’s control in Podolsk. Despite this apparent loss of the
factory, Dixon was continuing to petition the State Department for Podolsk’s benefit. While
Dixon’s earlier conversations with the U.S. State Department had been based on the hope of
continuing Singer’s operations in Podolsk, he now turned to the State Department for help in
reinstating himself and Singer in Podolsk. Dixon was functioning as an employee of Kompaniya
Singer, yet he was already himself in exile. By continuing to petition the State Department for
aid in Russia, Dixon and Singer were operating under the assumption they would one day return
to reclaim their property in Podolsk. They were treating the factory, as they were Dixon, as a
part of Kompaniya Singer that was temporarily out of commission. Dixon and Podolsk were
early aspects of Kompaniya Singer’s company in exile.
Dixon and the Singer leadership saw both the Podolsk factory’s loss and Dixon’s
departure from Russia as temporary. Dixon’s wife was ethnically Russian, and several of their
family members remained in Russia during the Civil war. In April 1918, the Secretary of the
Singer Manufacturing Company, inquiring through the State Department into the welfare of
Dixon’s Russian family, described Dixon as “a Director of our Subsidiary Russian Company
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who left Russian temporarily last November.”221 As late as 1921 letter to Douglas Alexander,
Dixon signed his name over his position as a director of the Russian Company. 222 Singer’s use
of such qualifiers and titles, even if they remained technically true, reveal an underlying
presumption of Kompaniya Singer’s continued existence as a company in exile. Rather than a
returning American, Dixon was styled as a visitor who would soon be returning to his post in
Russia.
Concurrent with his labelling as a visitor, however, Dixon began to be grounded more
firmly in the American Singer operations. Dixon was given a new position as Work Manager at
Singer’s factory in Elizabethport, New Jersey. Alongside this new position, however, he
continued to be an ambassador for Kompaniya Singer.

Dixon again met with U.S. State

Department officials again in 1918, and Singer once again requested a meeting between Dixon
and American officials in April 1922. Dixon’s on-the-ground experience in Russia was unique
in Singer’s American leadership, and this experience helps to explain his continued connection to
discussions of Russia. When Douglas Alexander received new information on the situation in
Russia or on Singer’s Russian interests, he often forwarded this material to Dixon. While
Dixon’s experience added perspective and context to Alexander’s understanding of these new
developments, this communication also served to keep Dixon actively involved in the company
in exile. Through these updates, Dixon was kept current with the operations of the erstwhile
Kompaniya Singer. This information was more than just of academic interest. Dixon needed to
be kept up-to-date with the situation in Russia, if he were to one-day return.
At the Center of the Company in Exile: Otto Myslik
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The Russian communications that Alexander forwarded to Dixon came through Otto
Myslik. Myslik had been in charge of Kompaniya Singer’s sales operations, and after the
Revolution he became the linchpin in the communication of the company in exile. Myslik
received and initiated communication with both his former employers and the Singer
Manufacturing Company executive leadership. While some of this communication was certainly
fueled by Myslik’s personal and “Mercurian” relationships with his employees, as explored in
the previous chapter, this communication also reflected a change in Myslik’s job description.
After leaving Russia for Constantinople, Myslik arrived in Paris by December 1919.223
Once in Western Europe, Myslik’s role with Singer expanded beyond the Russian company.
Along with a Mr. Adcock, another Singer employee, Myslik took on the “general direction and
supervision of the work of reconstruction of the business in the countries which have been so
much devastated by the war.”224 Myslik’s new responsibilities covered territory from Egypt to
Amsterdam, in addition to the Baltic states and Poland. 225 These disparate locations and the
upheaval of war required Myslik to travel extensively in 1920, to the point that Douglas
Alexander apologized for the inconvenience.226
Despite these new responsibilities, Kompaniya Singer and the state of affairs in Russia
continued to require Myslik’s attention and his time. In Douglas Alexander’s letters to Myslik,
Russia features prominently. Alexander wrote 58 letters to Myslik between December 1919 and
February 1921. Over twenty of these letters included mention of Kompaniya Singer, Soviet
Russia, or newly independent regions once connected to Kompaniya Singer’s sales network.
The following year, the numbers were comparable. Unfortunately, Myslik’s responses are not
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extant. Through Alexander’s side of the conversation, however, it is possible to reconstruct a
likely explanation of both men’s understanding of and hope for the Russian situation.
In 1919 and 1920, Alexander’s letters seem less than optimistic about the situation in
Russia.

While confiding to Myslik at the end of 1919 that he had great hope for the

improvement of world affairs in the coming year, Alexander bemoaned the fact that “[f]or the
moment it is true the Russian situation seems to be quite hopeless.” 227

Even within this

pessimism, however, is buried a token of optimism about the eventual return to Russia.
Alexander writes that the ongoing White Russian retreats in Ukraine “justify [Singer’s] decision
not to do anything more in that country than to attempt to maintain the nucleus of an
organization.”228 Despite the dismal and seemingly hopeless situation in Russia, Alexander does
not suggest that Singer abandon the Russian market completely. Although Dixon and Myslik
had already been forced to leave the country, Alexander saw the presence of sales staff, albeit a
small “nucleus” of its former self, to be justifiable in Russia. This staff would be the foundation
for Kompaniya Singer’s return to Russia.
After the departure of Dixon and Myslik, how was Singer to maintain this “nucleus” of a
staff? Although the exact methods of the maintenance varied over time and space, Singer
initially depended on the existing business infrastructure of the company to maintain contact
with its employees. Although Dixon and Myslik were no longer located in Russia, Myslik was
able to retain indirect control of the former Kompaniya Singer through Mr. Schick, the head of
the Extraordinary Committee of the Highest Economical Council of the People (also referred to
as the Extraordinary Commission of the Supreme Council of National Economy), which had
been appointed to oversee Singer’s property. Schick was a friend of Kompaniya Singer and
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Singer employees stressed in their affidavits that Schick acted in Singer’s best interest.229
Myslik placed great faith in the Extraordinary Commission and by extension Schick. In a letter
to Alexander in March 1919, Myslik explained the Extraordinary Committee’s success in
fighting against taxes imposed on the Podolsk factory by the Podolsk Soviet. Myslik concluded
that he had “every reason to believe the Extraordinary Commission will work also further on
these lines to save the factory as well as business organisation [sic] from ruin.”230 Although the
situation was far from ideal, Myslik believed that Schick and the Extraordinary Committee could
maintain Singer’s assets, including its employee “nucleus.”
What Myslik did not yet realize when he wrote to Alexander in March 1919, was that the
Extraordinary Committee had been officially replaced by direct Soviet management of Singer’s
assets in January 1919. Despite this change, however, Schick remained the dominant force in the
new management.231 Likely with Schick’s knowledge, Myslik was regularly informed of the
company’s affairs and remained able to direct Singer’s affairs and its employees from
Constantinople until the end of 1919.232 Although Myslik was officially disassociated from the
company, in practice the employees continued to report to Myslik through Schick.
In November 1919, however, Schick died.233 The loss of Schick was a blow to Myslik
and the Singer leadership. Schick had been a respected and known entity, whom Myslik trusted
to keep Kompaniya Singer intact. Schick had been amenable to the interests of Singer, but his
replacement, a Mr. Revidzoff, was not. Revidzoff, unlike Schick, was a true Bolshevik, and his
rise to the top of the former Kompaniya Singer hastened the “full application of Bolshevik
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theories to the Singer Company.” 234

Without a friendly executive atop the remnants of

Kompaniya Singer within Russia, Myslik was increasingly removed from the daily operations of
Kompaniya Singer. Schick’s death and the further unwinding of affairs at Kompaniya Singer’s
Moscow headquarters may have fueled Douglas Alexander’s pessimism about the future of
Kompaniya Singer at the end of 1919.
Despite this turn of affairs, Alexander and Myslik retained a modicum of hope in the
midst of their hopelessness, especially in their discussion of the Siberian Singer shops. Although
Myslik had been controlling the Siberian shops as part of Kompaniya Singer, it was clear by the
middle of 1920 that this situation would not be sustainable. European Russia was controlled by
the Bolshevik forces, while anti-Bolshevik powers had their strongholds in the east.

As

discussed in the previous chapter, Voldemar Ernst was given the power of attorney to separate
Singer’s Siberian infrastructure from the remnant of Kompaniya Singer. In one sense, this
separation was Singer’s acceptance of the loss of its business in European Russia.
Communication and managerial networks between Moscow, Paris, and New York had been
greatly damaged, and the only way to oversee and protect the Siberian business was to tie it
directly to New York. In such a scenario, it would seem logical to free the Siberian business
from formal subordination to Kompaniya Singer as soon as possible.
Alexander and Myslik, however, followed a different course. In August 1920, Alexander
urged Myslik to postpone the separation of the Siberian business from Kompaniya Singer for as
long as possible. Alexander hoped that a delay in separation would allow for more definite
geographic boundaries to be established between Siberia and Western Russia. 235 Both Myslik
and Alexander envisioned a definitive division between the two territories. Without this vision,
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it would have been moot to discuss the establishment of a distinctly Siberian Singer network. To
Alexander, however, this separation had the possibility to be a lasting one with well-defined
international borders. A non-Soviet Russia, perhaps co-existing with a Soviet Russia, seemed a
distinct possibility and served as a hope for Alexander’s conception of his company’s Russian
interests.

In contradiction, Alexander’s hesitation to separate the Siberian business from

Kompaniya Singer left open the hope for a speedy reunification of Russia under conditions
favorable to Singer’s business. Although Alexander does not mention this possibility, a swift
victory of the White Armies would have made the separation of Singer’s European and Siberian
business unnecessary. In either scenario, the continuation of Singer’s Russian business was
assumed. The exact form of this business was unclear, but Alexander and Myslik expected to
retain at least portions of Kompaniya Singer’s organization and market.
In order to retain and regain this market, Myslik and Alexander needed to maintain
Kompaniya Singer’s labor force. Historians, including Robert Davies and Andrew Godley, have
stressed the role of Singer’s innovative sales and customer support networks in the company’s
global success.236

Singer’s widespread national networks of retail shops required a large,

dependable employee base, and qualified employees had been difficult to find in Russia. 237 The
lack of suitably trained Russian employees led Kompaniya Singer to hire many foreign managers
and ethnic minorities, as discussed in an earlier chapter. After the Revolutions, the skilled
employees which Kompaniya Singer had worked hard to identify and train were dispersed
throughout the world. In order to be prepared to reenter Russia, Singer needed to retain its
valuable human capital—what Alexander repeatedly called a “nucleus of an organization.”
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Maintenance of this workforce in exile fell to Myslik. As the former head of Kompaniya
Singer’s sales organization, Myslik was well-known to the employees and he became the
recipient of many appeals for help. Many Kompaniya Singer employees, and even their family
members, wrote to Myslik for a variety of different types of aid. Some, like former Moscow
bookkeeper Emil Fridlender, asked for jobs outside of Russia.238 Other employees asked for
money to help in their adjustment to exile or to reimburse their expenses in leaving Russia. 239
Myslik and Alexander granted many of the employees’ requests. In September 1921, Alexander
gave Myslik $10,000 to use as he saw fit in the aid of Kompaniya Singer employees, both inside
and outside of Russia. Alexander suggested that Myslik keep secret this fund, but that he use it
and his efforts to “maintain for Russia both inside and out the nucleus of an organization upon
which we shall be able to successfully build when conditions become such as to make it possible
for us to seriously undertake it.” 240 To the Singer leadership, the financial support of Kompaniya
Singer’s employees in exile and those confronting the Civil war within Russia was an investment
in the future of Singer’s Russian business.
In addition to financial assistance, this investment in the future of Kompaniya Singer also
necessitated actively sustaining personal relationships and communication between the
Kompaniya Singer leadership, embodied by Myslik, and the former employees. In August 1921,
Myslik, joined by Walter Dixon, met with groups of Kompaniya Singer employees in Berlin. 241
While the meetings allowed Singer to compile affidavits for its eventual legal cases against the
Bolsheviks, these conferences also renewed face-to-face the relationships between Singer and its
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employees. Responding to the concerns of the Kompaniya Singer employees, Myslik cabled
Alexander to institute severance pay for those employees for whom “suitable positions” could
not be found outside of Russia. It may be that Singer could not integrate such a mass of extra
employees into its European networks, much as the interwar economies of European nations
could not adequately employ the emigrants of Russia Abroad. It is also possible that not all of
these employees were part of the Kompaniya Singer “nucleus” that Alexander and Myslik
deemed necessary for rebuilding their Russian operation. One group that did seem to be part of
that “nucleus” was the trusted employees remaining in Russia.
In the same telegram in which he outlined his plan for pay to the company’s unemployed
former workers, Myslik confided to Alexander that money must be set aside “for the purpose of
supplies food stuffs [sic] as soon as possible to employees in Russia all of which must be
encouraged in every way to remain.”242 Alexander concurred, writing plainly a year later that
the Singer should “keep such experienced employees whose loyalty is unquestioned available in
Russia…for starting up our work there again when the proper time arrives….” 243 Trusted
employees remaining in Russia, which became an increasingly small group as the 1920s
progressed, were a valuable link between the company in exile and its property and operations
in Russia. These employees knew both the Singer organization and the ways in which that
organization had been reorganized and amended by the nationalizing authorities. In order to
restart their business efficiently, the Singer executives would need this information.
Accordingly, keeping such employees loyal and in Russia was important for keeping tabs on the
former Kompaniya Singer.
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Myslik continued to do what was possible to aid the company’s employees remaining in
Russia, though there was often little that could be done to keep such employees in their posts.
The story of Myslik’s own brother, Jan, is a prime example. Jan Myslik had been employed by
Kompaniya Singer as a Central Agency Manager at Saratov before the Revolutions. In 1918, the
leadership of the nationalized Singer company appointed him to oversee two combined central
agencies in Moscow. Two years later, Jan Myslik was arrested by Soviet authorities, but after
103 days he was released and allowed to return to his work. 244 With his personal connections to
the Singer leadership, Jan Myslik was the sort of loyal employee that the Singer executives
sought to retain. Douglas Alexander specifically mentioned Jan Myslik in a letter to his brother
Otto in 1922, suggesting that Myslik be sure his brother received aid from the company.245 Given
their familial connection, it is likely that Otto Myslik did his best to ensure such aid reached Jan.
Despite these efforts, however, Jan Myslik left Moscow for Prague in late 1922. 246 He had been
fired by the Bolshevik authorities on suspicion of funneling information to Singer.247
Whether or not Jan Myslik gave information to Kompaniya Singer while working for its
Bolshevik successor (and it seems likely he did), the suspicion was well founded.

Other

Kompaniya Singer employees had done so. One employee, a Mr. Bertrow, explained to Otto
Myslik via letter in 1923 that the authorities’ suspicions regarding his correspondence had
caused him to limit it for some time. Through a hand delivered letter, however, Bertrow was
eager to once again communicate with Myslik. 248 While letters could sometimes be passed, as
Bertrow did, to travelers leaving Russia, this system was not always dependable. 249 Border
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control officials prevented many emigrants from taking any documentation out of Russia. While
some things could be hidden, many Singer employees were forced to leave all of their papers
behind.
Trusted employees remaining in Russia were an essential source of information for the
company in exile, but employees that had just emigrated were also important informers.
Recognizing the value and depth of information held by such employees, Singer used forms in
1921 and 1922 to standardize the collection of written accounts from such employees. Several
pages in length, these forms included a wide variety of questions, depending on the experience of
the employee. Owczarski, who worked at Podolsk, was asked twenty-four questions, ranging
from the composition of the factory management to the factory working hours to the general
situation in the town.250 Even the most basic information was valuable to Singer executives
planning a return to Russia. Copies of Owczarski’s detailed report were forwarded by Myslik to
Alexander, and from Alexander to Dixon.251

Once Kompaniya Singer was once again

controlling Podolsk, all three men would need to be ready to respond to the situations Owczarski
described.
Myslik was the clearinghouse for Kompaniya Singer information. Taking letters from
Alexander on one side and destitute Kompaniya Singer employees on the other, Myslik spread
information and aid between the management and the workers. By doing so, he kept alive the
company in exile. As time wore on, however, there was less new information to disseminate.
Fewer loyal employees remained in Russia. A 1923 list of “former employees in Russia” listed
only nineteen current employees of Glavschveimachin, some of whom were only assumed to be
working for the company. While Singer likely had other contacts not included on this list—the
“Polozhenie na Zavode v Podolsk,” December 27, 1921, box 158, folder 4, Singer Mss.
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list was compiled by the former company’s cashier in Moscow, and includes primarily Moscow
employees—it is important to note the relative obscurity of many of these employees. While the
Moscow cashier, bookkeeper, and a few shop managers are mentioned, the list consists primarily
of office clerks. Those Kompaniya Singer employees in higher positions had, like Jan Myslik,
recently been forced out of the former Kompaniya Singer management. Others had left the
country. Although the records do not say so explicitly, it seems likely that additional employees
found their connection to Singer to be too great a liability, as Bertrow had implied, and ceased
communication. As time wore on, Douglas Alexander’s “nucleus” of employees within Russia
was eroding.
When the Red Army established control over the far reaches of Russian territory, the
immediate resurrection of Kompaniya Singer changed from a realistic scenario to an increasingly
improbable dream. Voldemar Ernst, the head of Singer’s Siberian business, left for Harbin in
1923. In late 1923, Singer’s Georgian business was nationalized by the Soviets. The Singer
Manufacturing Company no longer had any direct control over the shops and possessions of its
Russian subsidiary.

Without a foothold remaining in Russia, the perspective of Singer

executives toward the reemergence of their business changed. While Alexander had held out
great hope for the Georgian business in 1922, its confiscation in September 1923 came as no
surprise. With palpable resignation, Alexander wrote Myslik that he had “no expectation that
any other result was possible in view of the general situation.” 252 The writing was on the wall
for Kompaniya Singer, and Alexander believed that little could be done to help those employees
remaining in Soviet lands. Acknowledging to Myslik the lamentable situation of Singer’s
manager in Tiflis, Alexander concluded that he was but “one of many” whom Singer could not
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help. 253 By late in 1923, Kompaniya Singer’s business had crumbled and so had the employee
“nucleus” within Russia. Singer executives did not entirely abandon the hope of reclaiming their
Russian business, nor did they completely abandon their attempts to aid former employees.
Reading the signs of the times, however, the Singer executives began to seriously consider other
ways of selling sewing machines in the Soviet Union.
Considering Trade with the Soviet Union: The International Harvester Model
The possibility of selling sewing machines and parts to the Soviet government was not a
new idea for Singer or other multinational companies. As early as the summer of 1919, Myslik
was entertaining the possibility of importing goods into Soviet Russia. 254 Although Alexander
was firmly opposed to the early discussions of trade with the Soviet authorities, many Western
businesses pursued relationships with the Soviet authorities. International Harvester was one of
these companies. In the mid-1920s, as Singer executives began to accept the improbability of
reclaiming their property within Russia, they began to consider aspects of the International
Harvester model.
International Harvester’s Russian business had much in common with Kompaniya
Singer. The two companies were the largest and most successful American businesses in Russia
prior to the First World War, and they have often been compared to each other.255 Like Singer,
International Harvester operated a factory in Russia and employed a retail sales force across the
empire.256 Although the machines International Harvester and Singer manufactured were quite
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different, there were many parallels between the companies’ Russian organizations. Thanks to
these similarities, Singer could have chosen to follow International Harvester’s path during and
after the Russian Revolution.
There were also key differences between Singer and International Harvester, however,
that help to explain why Singer did not follow International Harvester’s path. Agricultural
machinery was more important to the developing Soviet state than were sewing machines.
While Singer’s Podolsk factory had been converted to wartime production, International
Harvester’s factory continued to manufacture agricultural machinery. The Soviet agricultural
officials placed orders with International Harvester. 257 Through the help of American Red Cross
representative and de facto diplomat Raymond Robins, International Harvester avoided the
nationalization of its factory. 258
Although International Harvester continued to operate its factory until the middle of
1923, production was difficult. The factory operated at a loss after 1914. 259 From 1922, the
Soviet authorities wanted International Harvester to update its production facilities and increase
its production. Unwilling to implement such expensive improvements or to operate its factory as
a Soviet concession, International Harvester eased production in May 1923. 260 In September
1924, the factory was officially nationalized by the Soviet authorities. 261
While nationalization of its factories and retail shops had ended Singer’s sales in Russia,
International Harvester continued to invest in the Russian market. As early as April 1920,
International Harvester began selling American-produced machinery to Soviet buyers.
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International Harvester was approached by Selskosoyus, one of the Soviet purchasing agencies
exporting American goods to Russia, even before the United States had officially opened trade
with the Soviet Union.262 In 1921, when America allowed free trade with the Soviet Union,
International Harvester sold $1.5 million worth of goods to its Russian partners. 263 Although
American businesses were initially hesitant to conduct business with Soviet Russia, these
hesitations diminished as the Soviet companies met their financial obligations. 264 In 1924,
International Harvester became one of the first American companies to extend credit to Soviet
buyers.265 The sales of International Harvester and its competitors made the Soviet Union the
recipient of a quarter of American tractor exports between 1925 and 1929.266
After 1917, International Harvester’s approach to the Russian market was very different
from Singer’s. Not without reason, historians like Floyd James Fithian have used the stories of
International Harvester and Singer to demonstrate the two extremes of post-Revolution
engagement with the Soviet market by firms active in pre-Revolutionary Russia.

Fithian

concludes that while Singer “departed from the Russian scene and did not reappear in any
significant way” before American recognition of the Soviet Union, International Harvester “was
never very far from the Russian market.”267 Fithian is right, of course, that International
Harvester was far more involved in Soviet Russia than was Singer, but Singer’s limited
involvement in Soviet Russia was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, the decision to avoid trade
with the Soviet government was a decision that had to be made by Myslik and Alexander over
and over again in the early 1920s. The stability of Russia as a trading partner and the definitive
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loss of Kompaniya Singer’s foothold in Russia in 1923 made trade with Russia an increasingly
plausible option.
Selling to the Soviets
Since leaving Russia, Singer had had a standing policy of not trading with Soviet Russia.
Douglas Alexander often reiterated to Otto Myslik Singer’s opposition to trade with Russia. 268
New opportunities for such trade appeared often. In March 1921, for instance, Singer’s New
York offices were approached by a representative of what Alexander called the “Co-operative
Society of Russia.” This businessman presented a purchase list of desired Singer goods, both
machines and parts. Identical lists were given to Singer’s representatives in Paris, Berlin, and
Stockholm.269 At about the same time, another Singer employee brought to Alexander and
Myslik’s attention a possibility for doing business in Soviet Russia. 270

In both instances,

Alexander and Myslik turned down the possibility of trade with Russia. The company’s position
was not to enter into business with the Soviet government until the situation of its confiscated
property had been resolved.
Although this general policy remained, it weakened by the middle of the decade. In
1924, if not before, Singer began selling a limited number of machines to the All Russian
Cooperative Society, known as Arcos. 271 A British company registered in 1920, Arcos received
sums of gold from the Soviet authorities to purchase needed goods abroad. 272 In 1923, an
American branch of Arcos, later to be enfolded into Amtorg, was incorporated in the United
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States.273

By selling machines to Arcos, Singer was changing its earlier policy of non-

engagement with the Soviet authorities. Singer had not been compensated for its property or
reinstated in its Russian business, yet the company had tentatively embarked on a new method of
selling its goods in Russia.
This method was tentative, because the sales to Arcos were not a complete break with
Singer’s earlier policy. While other American and British companies offered credit to the Soviet
trade companies, Singer worked strictly on a cash basis. 274 Singer continued to offer cash sales to
Arcos and other Soviet agencies in following years, though credit was denied even to former
employees of the company. 275

The Singer executives maintained that unless the Soviet

government were to “change their policy and discuss the settlement of former
engagements…they [would] not be able to obtain the Capital which they need to keep their
industries going….” 276 Myslik and Alexander still held out hope that the Soviet authorities would
resolve their “former engagement,” but they were not opposed to small sales in the meantime.
These small sales helped to keep the Singer’s products in the mind of Russian consumers.
In quantities and influence, these small sales were certainly no replacement for Singer’s
pre-Revolutionary Russian infrastructure and autonomy. Although Singer was able to enter the
Soviet market in a small way, it was not able to reconstitute Kompaniya Singer. Even as they
pursued these exchanges with Soviet trading agencies, Singer leaders envisioned a Soviet import
scheme that would be led by Kompaniya Singer’s foreign employees. In 1926, Myslik wrote to
several former Kompaniya Singer employees to discuss the possibility of establishing former
employees within the Soviet Union as private traders. These trusted employees would import
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and sell Singer goods, in competition with the state-run trading agencies.277 The records are
incomplete, but it seems unlikely that anything ever came of this plan.
Although Singer did not establish large-scale trade with the Soviet Union in the same
way that International Harvester and other Western firms did, the possibility of such trade gave
direction to the company in exile.

Plans like the 1926 possibility of establishing former

Kompaniya Singer employees as independent traders revealed the importance of continuing to
foster the remnants of Alexander’s organizational “nucleus” within Russia. In the aid of these
Russian contacts, Myslik continued to draw on the $10,000 aid fund set up in 1921. By
November 1927, the company had given away $6,136.31. 278 Understood as aid by the recipients,
this money served as an investment for Singer. If the company were ever to resume the sale of
sewing machines in Russia, it would need trusted, Soviet contacts.
During the New Economic Policy (NEP), the possibility of trade with the Soviet Union
seemed possible. After the nationalizations of the Civil war period, the possibility of privately
owned business which grew from the NEP policies gave many foreign investors and companies
the impetus to invest in and trade with the Soviet Union.279

Companies whose assets or

businesses had been nationalized after the October Revolution, however, were cautious in their
involvement with the Soviet Union.280 For Singer, any large-scale trade could only come with
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compensation for its confiscated property. 281

Singer’s executives held out hope for this

compensation. NEP had signaled a substantial change from the Soviets’ earlier economic policy.
If the policies and approaches of the Soviets could change enough to allow NEP, perhaps they
could evolve to compensate companies for the property they had nationalized. At least as long as
NEP endured, the hope of expanded trade with the Soviet Union remained.
While employees within Russia remained an important commodity, employees outside of
Russia had evolved from a distinct Russian labor force to a network of consultants. Many of
Singer’s former employees had been incorporated into Singer’s other European or American
businesses. The affidavits of Kompaniya Singer employees taken in 1930 reflect this integration
of Kompaniya Singer employees. Fifteen of the nineteen identified affidavit writers mention
current jobs with Singer.282 The company in exile had become a communication network that
could be called upon for advice or assistance. The creation of the 1930 affidavits themselves
speak to the importance of such a network. On a daily basis, however, the Kompaniya Singer
employees had been assimilated into Singer’s other branches. They were settled into new homes
and new careers. The possibility of returning to Russia, which had been so likely in the early
1920s, was very remote by 1930.
Kompaniya Singer, the Company in Exile, and Company Men
Throughout the 1920s, Singer’s perspective on the future of its Russian business shifted
drastically.

In the early 1920s, Singer Manufacturing Company executives expected an
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imminent return to Russia, but by 1923 and 1924 the reemergence of Kompaniya Singer was
moving from improbable to impossible. Over the course of these changes, the maintenance of
Kompaniya Singer’s information networks and the retention of its former employees were
reiterated time and again as important goals by Singer’s leadership. To Alexander and Myslik,
Kompaniya Singer employees evolved from the “nucleus of an organization” necessary for the
resurrection of Kompaniya Singer’s manufacturing and retail operations to key sources of trusted
information and finally to a network of occasional consultants. Despite this evolution, however,
the Singer leadership continued to invest in and support its former Russian employees. These
employees, whose knowledge of Singer’s Russian affairs was coupled with a record of loyalty
and trustworthiness, were not interchangeable cogs in the machine of the Singer Manufacturing
Company. They were a rare and valuable commodity—the sort of company men worthy of
investment.
Singer’s investment in these employees and their individual value further complicates
standard and dismissive understandings of company men. In Whyte’s portrait, organization men
were similarly educated, similarly trained, and generally exchangeable in the eyes of their
employer. While it was necessary, for instance, for DuPont to have engineers, it did not greatly
matter whether it had this particular engineer.

The uniformity of employees meant that

employers could rely on characteristics of groups instead of characteristics of individuals.
Singer’s investment in and reliance on its Kompaniya Singer employees, however, reveals a
different corporate view of employees. Once Kompaniya Singer became a company in exile,
these employees were valued for their personal experience and knowledge of Russia and their
demonstrated reliability. These traits could not be easily duplicated. To Myslik and Alexander,
the Kompaniya Singer employees that made up the “nucleus” of the Russian company were
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individually important.

This individual value and autonomy necessitated a more personal

relationship between the company and its company men. Rather than simply needing employees,
Singer needed these employees. Because there were so few of them, the employees were
important to the company not just as types, but as individuals.
This is not to say that every Kompaniya Singer employee was viewed individually by the
Singer leadership.

On the contrary, Singer often lumped together its Russian employees.

Alexander, removed from the Russian operations, referred only to an impersonal “nucleus of an
organization,” not to individual employees. It is likely that he had not met or heard of many
employees beyond Myslik, Dixon, and Ernst. Otto Myslik, as the link between the Singer
leadership and the Kompaniya Singer employees, however, had a different perspective. He
fostered communication with employees that he trusted and allocated money to employees he
deemed sufficiently needy and worthy. Through Myslik, the company invested in its employees
as individuals.
During the turmoil and uncertainty of the Civil war, Singer was a lifeline to many of its
displaced or disenfranchised employees, but the employees were simultaneously a lifeline for
Singer’s hope of a future business in Russia. The Singer executives and Kompaniya Singer
employees shared a symbiotic relationship in which both stood to gain. In the shifting sands of
the post-revolution era, this employer-employee relationship was not remote or formulaic.
Rather, it became an increasingly personal relationship of trust and improvisation. Within the
context of the multinational Singer corporation, executives and their employees built
relationships buoyed by their common values, cooperative experiences, and reciprocal needs.
From Kompaniya Singer to the company in exile and beyond, these men and women had forged
a community.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Before the First World War, Kompaniya Singer was one of the Singer Manufacturing
Company’s most significant and most successful national subsidiaries. Singer’s New York
leadership had high hopes for the Russian market, and it realized these hopes through
Kompaniya Singer’s vast retail network, Podolsk factory, and palatial Nevsky Prospect
headquarters. By 1930, however, Singer’s hopes had evaporated. Kompaniya Singer’s retail
shops had been shuttered or nationalized, its factory had become a Soviet operation, and its
former headquarters building was Soviet Petrograd’s House of Books (Dom Knigi). The Singer
globe remained as a beacon over the new Dom Knigi, but the events of the previous fifteen years
had shown the limits of the global enterprise it had been erected to symbolize.
As a multinational company with transnational ambitions and cosmopolitan management,
Singer was ill equipped to adjust to the rise of nationalistic policies and local political changes.
To the increasingly suspicious and nationally-minded imperial government, Kompaniya Singer’s
foreign ties were liabilities. To the rising Soviet government, Kompaniya Singer’s place within
global capitalism was likewise problematic. In both instances, the points of contention between
company and government went to the root of Kompaniya Singer’s raison d'être. Singer was at
its core a multinational company with the ambition of selling sewing machines around the globe,
what one London-based Singer employee described as “peacefully working to conquer the
world.”283 Although the company could attempt to adapt to the expanding ethnic nationalism of
the late Russian Empire, its endeavors were fundamentally limited. Similarly, while Singer’s
executives could entertain the notion of selling machines and parts to the Soviet government,
“Report on the Proceedings on the Occasion of Breaking Ground for the Singer Manufacturing Company’s New
Factory (at Kilbowie, near Glasgow, Scotland,” May 18, 1882, p. 22, quoted in Godley, “Selling the Sewing
Machine around the World,” 270.
283

104

their company’s capitalist essence and goals and the Soviet government’s socialist goals made
further assimilation impossible.
While Singer’s multinational nature became an insurmountable hurdle for the company’s
business in Russia, it was simultaneously an important factor in tying Kompaniya Singer’s
affidavit writers to the company. Singer’s transnational business networks became a source of
stability amid the turmoil of the First World War and Russian Civil War. The demise of
Kompaniya Singer was a substantial loss for the Singer Manufacturing Company, but the rest of
the company’s commercial empire continued. This continuity, even amid adversity, became an
asset for the Kompaniya Singer employees positioned or motivated to tap into Singer’s
multinational networks. For its managerial and cosmopolitan employees, especially its foreign
and ethnically non-Russian company men, identification with Singer had the potential to bring
immediate and future benefits. Singer’s transnational and supranational structure was fluid and
adaptable to the turmoil of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. This adaptability made
Singer’s network a valuable connection and source of aid for its similarly adaptable and
cosmopolitan employees. During the turbulent period from 1914 to 1930, this institutional
identity provided useful resources and security for many of Singer’s company men. For these
cosmopolitan company men, Singer became a network that reached beyond business objectives
into the realm of personal welfare.
Conceptualizing an End
Part of the difficulty in telling a story that blurs the lines between business and personal
experience is defining a beginning and, especially in Kompaniya Singer’s case, an end. The
demise of Kompaniya Singer’s network and the end of its employees’ identification with the
company were gradual and evolutionary processes. There are many different end points that
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could be placed on Singer’s Russian story. No single event signaled the end of the Russian
company or the communication and social network it sustained within the Russian lands, the
company in exile, or among former employees. The end came early for line workers at Podolsk,
but much later for Otto Myslik.

For Myslik and the Singer leadership, the dream of

reconstituting Kompaniya Singer or reemerging within the Russian market persisted for many
years after the last Singer shops in Russia had been nationalized. These different endings give
different meanings to different employees’ identification with Singer.
Chronologically, Kompaniya Singer’s first ending date is 1917. The Russian Revolution,
especially the October Revolution, brought substantial change to the country and substantial
uncertainty to Singer’s business. Some Kompaniya Singer employees welcomed this change. In
the early 1930s, American writer Myra Page visited Podolsk and described the revolutionary
fervor of workers who had once labored under Singer’s leadership. Page explains the years that
two employees, Feodor Trefanov and Andree Budnikov, spent working to bring about political
change in Podolsk and how, at news of the October Revolution they joined with others to take
over the Podolsk factory and “tossed [their] old cap[s], whooping, high in the air.”284 Pages’
book, published by a Soviet firm in the days of Stalinism, should not necessarily be taken at face
value, yet the fact remains that for Singer and all of Russian society the October Revolution
signaled a break from the status quo, even if that break was often more evolutionary than
instantaneous.285
The Singer Manufacturing Company itself recognized this break when it needed to
ascribe an end to Kompaniya Singer. In 1956, Singer’s New York management filed a claim
284
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with the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) that listed November 7,
1917, the day of the October Revolution, as the end of Kompaniya Singer. The FCSC, which
was established in the wake of World War II to seek reparations for the losses suffered by
American individuals and institutions in the upheaval of the early twentieth century, required
Singer to designate a date on which its “claim originally arose.”286 Within its claim, Singer
expands upon the difficulty of defining such a date:
Although actual physical confiscation of the Russian Company’s offices, shops,
warehouses, factory, timberlands, stocks of merchandise, cash, accounts receivable and
other assets was accomplished piecemeal by the Soviet Government as its control spread
throughout Russia and was not completed until some time [sic] late in 1919, for all
practical purposes Claimant’s loss arose November 7, 1917 when the Bolsheviks seized
the government in Petrograd, because what business the Russian Company was able to
conduct and what assets it retained temporarily after that date ultimately only benefited
and fell into the hands of the Soviet Government and none of the proceeds or profits
therefrom inured to the benefit of the Russian Company or Claimant in any way
whatsoever.287
For the legal proceedings Singer was engaged in, this statement is apt. As a business,
Kompaniya Singer did forfeit its profits and any sales after the revolution failed to financially
benefit the company. While these were the only benefits of interest to the FCSC, there were
other benefits that Singer and its employees continued to reap long after 1917. As this thesis has
attempted to show, many of Singer’s employees found great value indeed in the “assets” Singer
“temporarily retained” after the October Revolution. For those employees that became part of
the company in exile or Douglas Alexander’s Russian “nucleus of an organization,” Kompaniya
Singer carried on as a network and a facilitator of community until at least the late 1920s.
As the company in exile came to an end, however, Singer’s affidavit writers had to
reimage and change their relationship to Singer. Many of these changes were in progress by the
late 1920s. This thesis ends the story of Kompaniya Singer in roughly 1930. By the late 1920s,
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it seemed unlikely that Kompaniya Singer would ever reemerge. In 1930, Singer received for
the second time a large collection of affidavits from Kompaniya Singer’s former employees. The
first group of affidavits, collected in 1921, had been solicited at a time when Kompaniya
Singer’s return to Russia still seemed possible. Under the direction of Voldemar Ernst, Singer’s
business continued in the Russian Far East. In 1921, the hope of reclaiming Singer’s Russian
business remained. By 1930, however, most of the affidavit writers were settled in other jobs
and other locations. There was no longer the thought of personally returning to Russia and
reconstituting Singer’s business.
In one sense, however, even 1930 may be too early of an ending for Kompaniya Singer.
Singer’s claim with the FCSC was not submitted until 1956.

In July 1959, the Singer

Manufacturing Company was awarded $56,287,962.58 in repayment for its losses, but Singer
never received most of that sum.288 As the FCSC website states: “The balance of the awards…
remains unpaid and outstanding, pending conclusion of a final claims settlement agreement
between the United States and what are now the republics of the former Soviet Union.”289
Financially, the story of Kompaniya Singer is ongoing, even if a final resolution seems
increasingly unlikely as time goes on. Yet, for the company’s employees the story is long since
over. Walter Dixon died in 1935, and Otto Myslik followed in 1955. Both men made their
careers with Singer as lifelong company men. Even after Russia, Singer remained an important
piece of their identities.290
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Identifying with Singer
The importance of Singer as a network and an identity for its employees raises a problem:
What role did Singer serve and how did identification with Singer complement or compete with
other identities, such as nationality or class? Navigating and reimagining identity was not new to
Singer’s executives and company men. As the first chapter illustrates, Kompaniya Singer’s
leaders had reimagined the national identities of the company and themselves during the First
World War. Singer sought, as best it could in light of its own business objectives, to conform to
the Imperial Russian government’s vision of Russianness and become more Russian. In the
aftermath of the Russian Revolution, however, Singer’s leaders moved the company toward a
different sort of Russianness and fundamentally a multi- and supranational identity. German
subject employees and Russian subject ethnic Germans, who had been shunned by the Russian
company during World War I, became the backbone of the company in exile. Was Singer’s
assertive Russianness during the War simply opportunism to ensure the business’ continuation?
Were the Singer executives deliberately making their company appear Russian in a way that it
never was? Was the ethnically diverse company in exile only a slipping of this wartime veneer?
In some ways, yes. Singer did stress its Russianness during the First World War in ways
that seem, at best, to overstate its case. Before the committee from the Zemgor, Walter Dixon
stressed the strong, Russian credentials of Kompaniya Singer’s executives even though the truth
of these employees’ ethnic identities was far more complex. Singer’s survival (or, at least, its
success) in the late Russian Empire necessitated the national fluidity of its executives and the
company itself.291 This fluidity and adaptability was a characteristic trait of the Singer
Manufacturing Company, and perhaps even a prerequisite for its transnational and global
291
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success. To the extent that Kompaniya Singer continued to tap into and used this national
adaptability and fluidity from 1914 to 1930, the Russification of the company during the First
World War would appear to be a façade.
This appearance is incomplete, however. There was something very real in Singer’s
quest to reimagine Kompaniya Singer as a Russian company, although it may not have been
what the Singer executives expected to find. Singer’s failure to successfully and convincingly
argue for Kompaniya Singer’s Russianness revealed the limits of identity fluidity. While the
Singer executives did not blink at becoming more Russian, the Russian government squinted at
them. To a government and business elite that were adopting an ethnically Russian national
identity, Singer’s Russification was unconvincing and incomplete. More importantly, it was
impossible to make it complete. The multinational origins of Kompaniya Singer meant that the
company would never have been able to be Russian in the same way that a native Russian
enterprise would have. Singer’s self-russification could only achieve so much; its potential was
limited from the start.
A similar limitation affected the identities of Kompaniya Singer’s employees throughout
the period covered by this investigation. These limitations are obvious within the choices and
circumstances of Otto Myslik. Myslik was legally a Russian subject, but he was not ethnically
Russian. He was, as Mona Domosh had argued about Walter Dixon, embedded within the
Imperial Russian culture, but he was also an outsider to ethnic Russian nationalism. Beyond
ethnic and national identity, Myslik was also limited by class and status. He was an executive
for a multinational capitalistic enterprise. Singer’s records do not suggest that Myslik had any
sympathy with Bolshevism, but even if he had been inclined towards joining in solidarity with
workers his past opposition to workers’ movements would not have recommended him. Like
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Myslik, many of the affidavit writers would have had a hard time being accepted in the
Bolshevik system. Bolshevism, like ethnic nationalism, was predicated on the existence of an
“us” and a “them.” Kompaniya Singer’s employees most frequently found themselves as part of
the “them.”
To the Singer Manufacturing Company, however, these same traits made the affidavit
writers members of an “us.” Singer’s multinational enterprise necessitated a multinational,
cosmopolitan network of managers. The company needed employees who could communicate
in English with the American headquarters, interact with Kompaniya Singer’s ethnically German
heritage, and also sell sewing machines to Russian peasants.

Cosmopolitan, “Mercurial”

employees were exceedingly valuable to Singer. The only way to expand or safeguard its
business was to employ men and women with the linguistic and cultural adaptability of the
newly mobile cosmopolitan business class. As bourgeois businessmen, Singer’s affidavit writers
lived a new and newly necessary form of cosmopolitanism. Identification with corporate
employers, especially multinational firms like Singer, was a fundamentally modern identity only
made possible through the expanded communication infrastructure and increased mobility of the
nineteenth century. For its modern cosmopolitan employees, however, identifying with Singer
became a useful identity that could function in tandem with or in opposition to more commonly
discussed identities like nation and class. Company men like the affidavit writers needed their
companies for income, of course, but this thesis suggests that they also needed it for patronage
and aid within their modern cosmopolitanism. Multinational enterprises were not fundamentally
in the business of community building, but Singer became the unwitting sustainer of a valuable
personal network for many of its cosmopolitan and mobile employees.
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For Singer’s German-speaking “Mercurian” employees (as discussed in Chapter 2),
Kompaniya Singer and later the company in exile were nexuses of class and national community.
Using Singer’s communication networks and infrastructure, German-speaking employees
maintained a loose social network. Singer’s executives likely never intended to help sustain a
minority ethnic community.

Hiring German-speaking employees had been a matter of

expediency, based on both Kompaniya Singer’s historical ties to Germany and the “Mercurian”
status of the Russian Empires German-speaking subjects. Working against network building,
Kompaniya Singer had willingly, although perhaps reluctantly, fired many of its Germanspeaking employees during the First World War. Yet, many ethnically German “Mercurians,”
even those interned during World War I, returned to Singer in the 1920s. To an extent, this
return may be simply a way of earning a living in a familiar industry.

For a mobile and

transnational population like Kompaniya Singer’s company men, however, the draw of
continued association with a transnational enterprise makes sense. Singer had an infrastructure
that supported their lifestyle and experience in a way that a nationally exclusive company could
not.
Discussion of Singer as a community, however, is necessarily limited and problematic.
Traditional communities are relational and spatially bounded. Such communities are created
through face-to-face relationships or kinship bonds.

Even within its German-speaking

“Mercurian” population, Kompaniya Singer did not fit this pattern. It was too big and too
diverse. If Singer can be spoken of as any sort of a community, then, it must be an imagined
community of the style made famous by Benedict Anderson.
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There is an important caveat to this appropriation of Anderson’s terms, however. To
Anderson, the national community is conceived as “a deep, horizontal comradeship.” 292 Even if
it is socially or economically false, the members of the national believe themselves to be equal.
As a company, Singer included a distinct hierarchy. This hierarchy is reflected in the centrality
of Otto Myslik within the imagined community of Kompaniya Singer. As the company’s leader,
Myslik was the hub of communication and the center of the Singer network. Myslik’s former
employees appealed to Myslik for help and clearly viewed him as an authority. In a similar vein,
Myslik turned to Alexander as his supervisor. During the Russian Civil War, however, the firm
hierarchy of peacetime was blurred. As the head of the company in exile, Myslik depended upon
the information and loyalty of his trusted employees within Russia. These employees functioned
with an autonomy that was unprecedented for Singer. Although the relationships between
Myslik and his employees were never truly horizontal, they were reciprocal and less fixed than is
typically the case in a business setting. Traditional business practices were impossible in the
uncertainty and flux of the Russian Revolution. This fluctuation created more improvisational
business strategies and a more mutually dependent, if not necessarily egalitarian, network. There
was a symbiosis between employee and company.
Cosmopolitans and a Transnational Elite
The interdependence and reciprocal networks of Singer and its affidavit writers provides
an additional perspective from which to consider the dynamics of the transnational business class
in the twenty-first century. The rise of a transnational capitalist class had been remarked upon in
the literature on twenty-first century globalization, but the networks forged by Singer’s company
a century earlier raise questions about how new a phenomenon this truly is.
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That is not to say that Singer’s employees were in every way similar to the employees of
the twenty-first century. Kompaniya Singer’s affidavit writers were not necessarily financially
well to do. They were certainly not all members of an economically elite class. Kompaniya
Singer’s affidavit writers ranged in profession from company executives (e.g. Dixon and Myslik)
to factory foremen (e.g. Owczarski). This diversity within their ranks would logically correlate
to differences in income and perhaps even social circles. If in fact these employees were
members of a single class, it was a class with substantial diversity. Moreover, the world in which
Kompaniya Singer’s employees worked, while it was more interconnected than the earlier world
had ever been, pales in comparison to the globalization of the twenty-first century.
Technological innovations have made the present world far smaller and the communication
networks far richer.
This wealth of communication networks hints at perhaps the largest divergence between
the experience of Singer’s affidavit writers and more recent discussions of a transnational
business elite: Singer’s employees were tied to Singer as an important facilitator of their
cosmopolitan community, while many scholars of the current trends in globalization suggest the
existence of a global class that operates without such a unifying institution. On the surface this
divergence is not surprising.

Singer was one of a very small number of multinational

corporations in the early twenty-first century, and the existence of a transnational class network
separate from the company was neither feasible nor necessary. There simply were not enough
bourgeois cosmopolitans to establish the kind of vast networks that are observed by scholars of
the present state of global industry.

Digging deeper, however, Singer’s experience raises

questions about the role of employers in the maintenance of the twenty-first century global elite.
Like Singer’s employees, today’s cosmopolitan businessmen and businesswomen are dependent
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on their employers for economic stability and often legal standing within their country of
residence. Like Singer’s employees, they are tied to that institution and they benefit from its
networks and influence. Such varieties make the cosmopolitan network of Singer, or other
corporations, different from the transnational class of our era, although they would certainly be
useful parallels within twenty-first century corporations.
Although it was principally a business, Singer was also a network and a community for
the employees that could choose to relate to Singer on such terms. It is not entirely clear which
employees had this choice. Would a factory line worker or a salesman in a remote shop have
had the same access to Singer’s community that was afforded employees at the Moscow offices?
Were such employees privy to the same cosmopolitan identity that permeated the ranks of the
affidavit writers? There questions are yet to be explored. A more complete investigation of the
Kompaniya Singer staff, including its ethnically Russian and locally established employees
would help to clarify the strands of national and cosmopolitan identities within the company as
well as illuminate the dynamics undergirding Singer’s role as a community. The Russian context
has provided a rich study for the examination of the adaptability of a multinational enterprise, but
placing Kompaniya Singer’s experience in dialogue with other Singer Manufacturing Company
outposts could allow for the discernment of further patterns or contradictions within Singer’s
imagined communities. In particular, it would be beneficial to consider the actions of Singer’s
European networks in the World War II era.
While these comparisons could expand the picture of community and identity within the
Singer network, perhaps the more significant expansions of this study would address the
intersections of cosmopolitanism, identity, and community within the era of early multinational
corporations. As these behemoths emerged within the business world, how did they shape and

115

respond to the forces of nationalism, internationalism, and class identity? How did the positions
of these resource-rich companies reflect or form the perspectives and identities of their
employees? The discussion of late nineteenth and early twentieth century European history is
often dominated by the discussion of nationalism and national identity. The study of how
average men and women contributed to and benefited from large multinational corporations and
organizations, which necessarily functioned with a level of national indifference, may help to
broaden our understanding of identity construction.
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